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Principles and politics: Like oil and water

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  • Randall Holcombe

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Suggested Citation

  • Randall Holcombe, 2009. "Principles and politics: Like oil and water," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 22(2), pages 151-157, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revaec:v:22:y:2009:i:2:p:151-157
    DOI: 10.1007/s11138-009-0074-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul A. Samuelson, 1956. "Social Indifference Curves," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 70(1), pages 1-22.
    2. Weingast, Barry R & Shepsle, Kenneth A & Johnsen, Christopher, 1981. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 642-664, August.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public choice; Political markets; Agency theory; Democracy; Structure; Scope; Performance of government; H11;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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