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An Insiders' View of FCC Spectrum Auctions

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  • Kwerel, Evan R
  • Rosston, Gregory L

Abstract

After a long period of awarding spectrum licenses inefficiently, changes in the budget and budgetary process coupled with increases in the value of the spectrum for non-broadcast use led Congress to allow the Federal Communications Commission to award licenses through competitive bidding. Contrary to the perceived view of government bureaucracies as excessively cautious, the FCC used the newfound authority to adopt a novel approach to auction design--simultaneous multiple round auctions. The innovative auction design would not have been adopted without the successful collaboration between government economists and academic economists, who helped to formulate and refine the design so that decision makers at the FCC could be convinced that the novel technique was both superior and practical. The FCC's implementation of competitive bidding was not only rapid as mandated by Congress, but also much less costly than outside alternatives and allowed the integration of spectrum policy decisions and auction design. Experience from several auctions has led to a number of open questions and refinements. The FCC is trying to replicate the success with the original auction design by facilitating dialog between the agency and outside auction experts in order to address these issues. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Kwerel, Evan R & Rosston, Gregory L, 2000. "An Insiders' View of FCC Spectrum Auctions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 253-289, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:17:y:2000:i:3:p:253-89
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kazumori, Eiichiro & Belch, Yaakov, 2019. "t-Tree: The Tokyo toolbox for large-scale combinatorial auction experiments," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C).
    2. Daglish, Toby & Sağlam, Yiğit & Ho, Phuong, 2017. "Auctioning the Digital Dividend: A model for spectrum auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 63-98.
    3. M. S. Iftekhar & A. Hailu & R. K. Lindner, 2014. "Does It Pay to Increase Competition in Combinatorial Conservation Auctions?," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 62(3), pages 411-433, September.
    4. Lawrence White, 2000. ""Propertyzing" the Electromagnetic Spectrum: Why It's Important, and How to Begin," Working Papers 00-08, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    5. Jeff Makholm, 2010. "Seeking Competition and Supply Security in Natural Gas: The US Experience and European Challenge," Chapters, in: François Lévêque & Jean-Michel Glachant & Julián Barquín & Christian von Hirschhausen & Franziska Ho (ed.), Security of Energy Supply in Europe, chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Evan Kwerel & Johathan Levy & Robert Pepper & David Sappington & Donald Stockdale & John Williams, 2002. "Economic Issues at the Federal Communications Commission," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 21(4), pages 337-356, December.
    7. Gregory Rosston, 2014. "Increasing the Efficiency of Spectrum Allocation," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 45(3), pages 221-243, November.
    8. Thomas W. Hazlett & David Porter & Vernon Smith, 2011. "Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Ronald Coase," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(S4), pages 125-165.
    9. Peter Cramton & Evan Kwerel & Gregory Rosston & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2011. "Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(S4), pages 167-188.
    10. Evan Kwerel & Paroma Sanyal & Katja Seim & Martha Stancill & Patrick Sun, 2017. "Economics at the FCC, 2016–2017: Auction Designs for Spectrum Repurposing and Universal Service Subsidies," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 51(4), pages 451-486, December.
    11. Glass, Victor & Tardiff, Timothy, 2019. "The Federal Communications Commission's rural infrastructure auction: What is hidden in the weeds?," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(8), pages 1-1.

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