IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/regeco/v12y1997i3p245-65.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Model of Product Recalls with Asymmetric Information

Author

Listed:
  • Marino, Anthony M

Abstract

This paper presents a model of involuntary product recall in which a firm has private information on its ability to produce safety. The ex post regulation of safety is motivated through a parametric imperfection in the product liability system which results in a firm under internalizing expected liability expenses. We treat the problem as one of mechanism design, where the regulator designs a recall procedure. This framework illuminates the point that recall is an interesting blend of ex ante and ex post regulation. We characterize a perfect recall procedure, contrast this with real world imperfect procedures, and study the interaction of the recall and the liability systems. Further, we analyze the interaction between optimal recall policy and product market structure. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Marino, Anthony M, 1997. "A Model of Product Recalls with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 245-265, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:12:y:1997:i:3:p:245-65
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0922-680X/contents
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Anthony M. Marino, 2021. "Product recall with symmetric uncertainty and multiunit purchases," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 1-21, August.
    2. Emeric Henry & Gianmarco Ottaviano, 2019. "Research and the Approval Process: the Organization of Persuasion," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/1gr6n3t28b9, Sciences Po.
    3. Ollinger, Michael, 2024. "Recall characteristics and food safety process control," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    4. Bae, Yong-Kyun & Benitez-Silva, Hugo, 2013. "Information Transmission and Vehicle Recalls: The Role and Regulation of Recall Notification Letters," MPRA Paper 50380, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Emeric Henry & Marco Loseto & Marco Ottaviani, 2022. "Regulation with Experimentation: Ex Ante Approval, Ex Post Withdrawal, and Liability," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5330-5347, July.
    6. Emeric Henry & Marco Ottaviani, 2019. "Research and the Approval Process: The Organization of Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(3), pages 911-955, March.
    7. Ratapol Teratanavat & Victoria Salin & Neal H. Hooker, 2005. "Recall event timing: Measures of managerial performance in U.S. meat and poultry plants," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(3), pages 351-373.
    8. Ollinger, Michael & Houser, Matthew, 2020. "Ground beef recalls and subsequent food safety performance," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    9. Thomsen, Michael R. & Ollinger, Michael & Crandall, Philip G. & O'Bryan, Corliss, 2008. "Mandatory Food Recalls," 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida 6083, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    10. Yong-Kyun Bae & Hugo Benítez-Silva, 2013. "The Effects Of Automobile Recalls On The Severity Of Accidents," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(2), pages 1232-1250, April.
    11. Yao, Liufang & Parlar, Mahmut, 2019. "Product recall timing optimization using dynamic programming," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 210(C), pages 1-14.
    12. Yongmin Chen & Xinyu Hua, 2012. "Ex Ante Investment, Ex Post Remedies, And Product Liability," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(3), pages 845-866, August.
    13. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1gr6n3t28b94tafji6op8tlqs1 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Chen, Yongmin & Hua, Xinyu, 2010. "Ex ante Investment, Ex post Remedy, and Product Liability," MPRA Paper 22031, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:12:y:1997:i:3:p:245-65. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.