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Contracting Under Endogenous Risk

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  • David Godes

Abstract

Agents make decisions by trading off cost, return and risk. The literature, however, does not consider the impact of risk on action choice. We show that this tradeoff has important implications for the firm. First, the firm may provide no insurance in the salary. Since the agent’s action choice will determine her risk, the salary cannot compensate her for it. Second, the firm may not be able to design an incentive scheme to implement particularly risky actions. Finally, the firm may not be able to design a scheme in which the agent splits her effort across multiple tasks. This is particularly problematic for tasks that are technological substitutes. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2004

Suggested Citation

  • David Godes, 2004. "Contracting Under Endogenous Risk," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 321-345, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:qmktec:v:2:y:2004:i:4:p:321-345
    DOI: 10.1007/s11129-004-0154-9
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    Cited by:

    1. Randolph Sloof & C. Mirjam van Praag, 2008. "The Effect of Noise in a Performance Measure on Work Motivation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-074/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    2. Li, Yanran & Li, Bo & Wang, Minxue & Liu, Yang, 2023. "Optimal sales strategies for an omni-channel manufacturer in livestreaming demonstration trends," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 180(C).
    3. Minkyung Kim & K. Sudhir & Kosuke Uetake, 2019. "A Structural Model of a Multitasking Salesforce: Multidimensional Incentives and Plan Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2199, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    4. Minkyung Kim & K. Sudhir & Kosuke Uetake, 2022. "A Structural Model of a Multitasking Salesforce: Incentives, Private Information, and Job Design," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(6), pages 4602-4630, June.
    5. Tinglong Dai & Kinshuk Jerath, 2013. "Salesforce Compensation with Inventory Considerations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(11), pages 2490-2501, November.
    6. Thomas Steenburgh, 2008. "Effort or timing: The effect of lump-sum bonuses," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 235-256, September.
    7. Fabio Caldieraro & Anne T. Coughlan, 2009. "Optimal Sales Force Diversification and Group Incentive Payments," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(6), pages 1009-1026, 11-12.

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