IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v33y1978i1p71-74.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Politicians and property rights

Author

Listed:
  • Adam Gifford
  • Gary Santoni

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Adam Gifford & Gary Santoni, 1978. "Politicians and property rights," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 71-74, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:33:y:1978:i:1:p:71-74
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00123944
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00123944
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/BF00123944?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Crain, W Mark & Deaton, Thomas H & Tollison, Robert D, 1977. "Legislators as Taxicabs: On the Value of Seats in the U.S. House of Representatives," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 15(2), pages 298-302, April.
    2. Crain, William Mark & Tollison, Robert D, 1976. "Campaign Expenditures and Political Competition," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(1), pages 177-188, April.
    3. George Stigler, 1972. "Economic competition and political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 91-106, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gregory Randolph, 2011. "The voter initiative and the power of the governor: evidence from campaign expenditures," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 265-286, September.
    2. Burton Abrams, 1981. "Political power and the market for governors," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 521-529, January.
    3. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Alex Coram, 2008. "The dynamics of resource spending in a competition between political parties: general notes on the Red Queen effect," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2008-01, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
    2. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
    3. Kevin Grier & Michael Munger, 1986. "The impact of legislator attributes on interest-group campaign contributions," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 349-361, September.
    4. Lott, John R, Jr, 2000. "A Simple Explanation for Why Campaign Expenditures Are Increasing: The Government Is Getting Bigger," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 359-393, October.
    5. W. Welch, 1981. "Money and votes: A simultaneous equation model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 209-234, January.
    6. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    7. Monika Köppl-Turyna, 2016. "Opportunistic politicians and fiscal outcomes: the curious case of Vorarlberg," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(3), pages 177-216, September.
    8. Yogesh Uppal, 2011. "Does legislative turnover adversely affect state expenditure policy? Evidence from Indian state elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 189-207, April.
    9. Galasso, Vincenzo & Nannicini, Tommaso, 2011. "Competing on Good Politicians," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 105(1), pages 79-99, February.
    10. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "The size and scope of government:: Comparative politics with rational politicians," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 699-735, April.
    11. Michael McKee, 1988. "Political competition and the Roman Catholic schools: Ontario, Canada," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 57-67, January.
    12. Sivadasan, Jagadeesh & Xu, Wenjian, 2021. "Missing women in India: Gender-specific effects of early-life rainfall shocks," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
    13. Blankenau, William & Skidmore, Mark, 2002. "The Relationship Between Education Finance Reform and Tax and Expenditure Limitations," Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy, Mid-Continent Regional Science Association, vol. 32(1), pages 1-18.
    14. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson & Daniel Sturm, 2005. "Political Competition and Economic Performance: Theory and Evidence from the United States," NBER Working Papers 11484, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 2003. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 7-73, March.
    16. Stefano Bartolini, 2000. "Collusion, Competition and Democracy," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 12(1), pages 33-65, January.
    17. John Burnett & Chris Paul & Allen Wilhite, 1997. "Political Campaigns as Rent-Seeking Games: Take the Money and Run," Public Finance Review, , vol. 25(5), pages 509-521, September.
    18. Glenn Parker & Matthew Dabros, 2012. "Last-period problems in legislatures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 789-806, June.
    19. Janet Kiholm Smith & Richard L. Smith, 1984. "State and Local Fiscal Policy: Implications for Property Values and Economic Growth," Public Finance Review, , vol. 12(1), pages 51-76, January.
    20. R. Urbatsch, 2012. "The paradox of voting intelligently," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 511-524, March.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:33:y:1978:i:1:p:71-74. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.