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Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem stretching to other fields

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  • Wulf Gaertner

    (University of Osnabrueck
    London School of Economics)

Abstract

Arrow’s impossibility result not only had a profound influence on welfare economics, but was, as this paper shows, also widely discussed in philosophy of science and in the engineering design literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Wulf Gaertner, 2019. "Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem stretching to other fields," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(1), pages 125-131, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:179:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-018-0503-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-0503-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gaertner,Wulf, 2006. "Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521028745, January.
    2. Sen, Amartya K, 1977. "On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1539-1572, October.
    3. Gaertner, Wulf, 2009. "A Primer in Social Choice Theory: Revised Edition," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199565306.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lederer, Patrick, 2024. "Bivariate scoring rules: Unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).

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