Sen is not a capability theorist

According to the standard reading, Sen’s contribution to justice consists in the defense of a capability theory, i.e. of a simple switch of focus from utility to capability. This paper aims to undermine this standard reading. We claim that this capability-theory view amounts to the application of formal welfarism to capabilities: social welfare is the aggregation of individual welfares, where welfare is properly defined by capabilities. We show that this view is inconsistent with Sen’s idea of justice, because the latter requires agents to be involved in the definition of what should count for the evaluation of social states, and how it should count. The value attributed to agency in Sen’s idea of justice is such that the process of choosing better policies trumps the substantive definition of what welfare should be. We defend instead a heuristic account of the status of capability in Sen’s thought: capability was introduced to make a point against welfarism; it is an argumentative step that does not imply a definitive commitment to a capability theory. We conclude that a fruitful discussion of his alternative theory of justice requires that we relocate his main contribution: we should see it as pertaining to a theory of public reasoning, not a theory based on a specific material of justice.