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Law-and-economics: why Gordon Tullock prefers Napoleon Bonaparte over the Duke of Wellington; and why he may end up on St. Helena

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  • Jennis Biser

Abstract

Most scholars in the field of law-and-economics lean to the view that the common law is efficient. Tullock, however, argues that the common law is inefficient and suggests dramatic modifications to the American legal system, transforming it from a common law system to a civil code system and abandoning the adversarial proceedings in favor of an inquisitorial process. This essay summarizes and critically evaluates the thrusts of Tullock’s 1988 article and his 1997 book, which, together direct a full-frontal attack on the Anglo-Saxon common law system. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

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  • Jennis Biser, 2014. "Law-and-economics: why Gordon Tullock prefers Napoleon Bonaparte over the Duke of Wellington; and why he may end up on St. Helena," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 261-279, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:158:y:2014:i:1:p:261-279
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-013-0083-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Charles Rowley & Daniel Houser, 2012. "The life and times of Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 3-27, July.
    2. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    3. Todd Zywicki, 2008. "Spontaneous order and the common law: Gordon Tullock’s critique," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(1), pages 35-53, April.
    4. Charles Rowley, 2012. "The intellectual legacy of Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 29-46, July.
    5. Robert K. Fleck & F. Andrew Hanssen, 2013. "Judges: why do they matter?," Chapters, in: William F. Shughart II & Laura Razzolini & Michael Reksulak (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, Second Edition, chapter 14, pages 233-248, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, 2012. "Litigation and legal evolution: does procedure matter?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 181-201, July.
    7. Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, 1974. "An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 257-286, January.
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    Cited by:

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    2. le Bris, David, 2019. "Testing legal origins theory within France: Customary laws versus Roman code," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 1-30.
    3. Vlad Tarko, 2017. "Neoliberalism and Regulatory Capitalism: Understanding the "Freer Markets More Rules" Puzzle," Working Paper Series 2017-02, Dickinson College, Department of Economics.
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    5. Vlad Tarko & Andrew Farrant, 2019. "The efficiency of regulatory arbitrage," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 141-166, October.

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