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The Political Economy of Automobile Safety Inspections

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  • Sutter, Daniel
  • Poitras, Marc

Abstract

Studies of traffic safety typically assume that policies are adopted to further the public interest, thereby ignoring the political motives for policy. Since political motives can influence the design or enforcement of policies, accounting for political motives has relevance for evaluating policy effectiveness. We examine the political motives concerning a frequently-studied traffic safety policy: state-mandated vehicle safety inspection. We distinguish between public interest and special interest explanations for safety inspection. Our econometric models examine the incidence of inspection across states, and determinants of regulated inspection fees. The evidence strongly rejects a public interest explanation, but special interest hypotheses also do not prove entirely satisfactory. Since recent studies find that inspections fail to improve highway safety, we attribute the continued existence of inspection programs to political transaction costs rather than to the demands of interest groups. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Sutter, Daniel & Poitras, Marc, 2002. "The Political Economy of Automobile Safety Inspections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(3-4), pages 367-387, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:113:y:2002:i:3-4:p:367-87
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    Cited by:

    1. Osmis Areda Habte & Håkan J. Holm, 2022. "Competition Makes Inspectors More Lenient: Evidence from the Motor Vehicle Inspection Market," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 61(1), pages 45-72, August.
    2. Peck, Dana & Scott Matthews, H. & Fischbeck, Paul & Hendrickson, Chris T., 2015. "Failure rates and data driven policies for vehicle safety inspections in Pennsylvania," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 252-265.
    3. Thomas A. Garrett & Gary A. Wagner, 2009. "Red Ink in the Rearview Mirror: Local Fiscal Conditions and the Issuance of Traffic Tickets," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(1), pages 71-90, February.
    4. Joshua Hall & Shree Baba Pokharel, 2017. "Does the Median Voter or Special Interests Determine State Highway Expenditures? Recent Evidence," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 45(1), pages 59-69, March.
    5. Castillo-Manzano, José I. & Castro-Nuño, Mercedes & Pedregal, Diego J., 2014. "The trend towards convergence in road accident fatality rates in Europe: The contributions of non-economic variables," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 229-240.
    6. Richard J. Cebula & Franklin G. Mixon Jr. & Kamal P. Upadhyaya, 2014. "Public Choice and the EPA, 20 Years Later: An Exploratory Study," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(2), pages 341-352, April.
    7. Kuniyoshi Saito, 2009. "Evaluating Automobile Inspection Policy Using Auto Insurance Data," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 27(2), pages 200-215, April.

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