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Congressional Dominance and the International Trade Commission

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  • De Vault, James M

Abstract

This study examines the unfair trade decisions of the International Trade Commission (ITC) and how they have been affected by Congress. It begins by identifying the means Congress can use to influence ITC decisions and then estimates both the extent to which these means have been used and the extent to which they have shaped the ITC's behavior. The study reaches two conclusions. First, Congress has tried to shape the ITC's behavior, but it has not tried to micromanage this behavior. Second, while the ITC's behavior has been influenced by Congress, congressional influence is not as important as other factors, such as statutory criteria. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • De Vault, James M, 2002. "Congressional Dominance and the International Trade Commission," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 110(1-2), pages 1-22, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:110:y:2002:i:1-2:p:1-22
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    Cited by:

    1. Aquilante, Tommaso, 2018. "Undeflected pressure? The protectionist effect of political partisanship on US antidumping policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 455-470.
    2. Benjamin H. Liebman & Kara M. Reynolds, 2006. "The returns from rent-seeking: campaign contributions, firm subsidies and the Byrd Amendment," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(4), pages 1345-1369, November.
    3. Vivienne Born & Lee Warren Brown & Dinesh Hasija, 2024. "Who obtains political exemptions? An attention-based analysis of steel tariff exclusion requests," Journal of International Business Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 7(2), pages 166-180, June.
    4. Nelson, Douglas, 2006. "The political economy of antidumping: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 554-590, September.
    5. Aquilante, Tommaso, 2015. "Bureaucrats or Politicians? Political Parties and Antidumping in the US," MPRA Paper 70359, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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