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On the Membership of Decision-Making Committees

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  • Bulkley, George
  • Myles, Gareth D
  • Pearson, Bernard R

Abstract

The decision of a committee is determined jointly by the voting process it adopts and the composition of its membership. The paper analyses the process through which committee members emerge from the eligible population and traces the consequences of this for the decisions of the committee. It is shown that the equilibrium committee will be composed of representatives from the extremes of the taste distribution. These extremes balance each other and the committee reaches a moderate decision. However, this mutual negation by the extremes is a socially wasteful use of time. Data from the UK House of Lords is used to illustrate these results. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Bulkley, George & Myles, Gareth D & Pearson, Bernard R, 2001. "On the Membership of Decision-Making Committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 106(1-2), pages 1-22, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:106:y:2001:i:1-2:p:1-22
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    1. Delegating to the wrong people: the strange case of interviewing undergraduate candidates at Oxford
      by Mainly Macro in Mainly Macro on 2012-12-07 17:16:00

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    Cited by:

    1. Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Martin J. Osborne & Matthew A. Turner, 2000. "Meetings with Costly Participation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 927-943, September.
    2. Daisuke Hirata & Yuichiro Kamada, 2020. "Extreme donors and policy convergence," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(1), pages 149-176, June.
    3. Chakravarty, Surajeet & Kaplan, Todd R. & Myles, Gareth, 2018. "When costly voting is beneficial," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 33-42.
    4. Quinn Weninger & Matthew tunrer, 2004. "Meetings with costly participation: An empirical," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 411, Econometric Society.
    5. Hirata, Daisuke & 平田, 大祐 & Kamada, Yuichiro & 鎌田, 雄一郎, 2019. "Extreme Lobbyists and Policy Convergence," Discussion Papers 2019-02, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    6. Gunnarsson, Victoria & Orazem, Peter & Sanchez, Mario A. & Verdisco, Aimee, 2004. "Does Local School Control Raise Student Outcomes?: Theory and Evidence on the Roles of School Autonomy and Community Participation," Staff General Research Papers Archive 11417, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    7. Matthew Turner & Quinn Weninger, 2005. "Meetings with Costly Participation: An Empirical Analysis," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 72(1), pages 247-268.
    8. Anna Panova, 2021. "On the costly voting model: the mean rule," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 301(1), pages 183-198, June.
    9. Gerlach-Kristen, Petra, 2006. "Monetary policy committees and interest rate setting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 487-507, February.
    10. Bosman, R. & Maier, P. & Sadiraj, V. & van Winden, F., 2013. "Let me vote! An experimental study of vote rotation in committees," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 32-47.
    11. Ronald Bosman & Philipp Maier & Vijollca Sadiraj & Frans van Winden, 2004. "Let Me Vote! An Experimental Study of the Effects of Vote Rotation in Committees," DNB Working Papers 023, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    12. Sabine Flamand & Orestis Troumpounis, 2014. "Participation quorums in costly meetings," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 53-62, April.
    13. Freimuth, Claudia & Oelmann, Mark & Amann, Erwin, 2018. "Development and prospects of standardization in the German municipal wastewater sector: Version 1.0," IBES Diskussionsbeiträge 223, University of Duisburg-Essen, Institute of Business and Economic Studie (IBES).
    14. Hamlin, Alan & Jennings, Colin, 2007. "Leadership and conflict," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 49-68, September.
    15. Daniel J. Smith, 2020. "Turn-taking in office," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 205-226, June.
    16. Tilman Borgers, 2004. "Costly Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 57-66, March.
    17. Bulkley, George & Myles, Gareth D., 2001. "Individually rational union membership," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 117-137, March.
    18. Nikitas Konstantinidis, 2013. "Optimal committee design and political participation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(4), pages 443-466, October.
    19. Matthew A. Turner & Quinn Weninger, 2001. "Meetings with Costly Participation: An Empirical Investigation," Working Papers mturner-01-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    20. Anderson, Simon & Meagher, Kieron J, 2012. "Choosing a Champion: Party Membership and Policy Platform," CEPR Discussion Papers 8941, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    21. Chakravarty, Surajeet & Kaplan, Todd R & Myles, Gareth, 2010. "The Benefits of Costly Voting," MPRA Paper 21372, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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