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Is the Median Voter a Clear-Cut Winner? Comparing the Median Voter Theory and Competing Theories in Explaining Local Government Spending

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  • Ahmed, Sultan
  • Greene, Kenneth V

Abstract

This paper attempts to test the power of the median model against the respective strength of other alternate models based on redistributive, political-institutional and interest group theories in explaining the demand for public spending in New York state counties during 1990, 1980 and 1970. To execute the comparison of the performance of median voter model with that of each of the nonmedian voter ones, various nonnested tests such as J and JA tests, N-tilde, W and encompassing tests have been employed. Results of the study show that although the median voter model has a marginal edge over the rival models based on the alternative theories, it may not be relied upon solely when many other institutional, redistributive and interest group factors are also relevant for explaining public spending. The results of this study differ from those in Congleton and Bennett (1995). We do not find that interest group models are substantially weaker than the median voter model. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Ahmed, Sultan & Greene, Kenneth V, 2000. "Is the Median Voter a Clear-Cut Winner? Comparing the Median Voter Theory and Competing Theories in Explaining Local Government Spending," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(3-4), pages 207-230, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:105:y:2000:i:3-4:p:207-30
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Phuong Nguyen-Hoang, 2012. "Fiscal effects of budget referendums: evidence from New York school districts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 77-95, January.
    2. Eric J. Brunner & Stephen L. Ross, 2007. "How Decisive Is the Decisive Voter?," Working papers 2007-28, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2008.
    3. Joshua Hall & Shree Baba Pokharel, 2017. "Does the Median Voter or Special Interests Determine State Highway Expenditures? Recent Evidence," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 45(1), pages 59-69, March.
    4. Benoît LE MAUX & Kristýna DOSTÁLOVÁ & Fabio PADOVANO, 2017. "Ideology and Public Policies: A Quasi-Experimental Test of the Hypothesis that Left-Wing Governments Spend More," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2017-01-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.
    5. Benoît Le Maux, 2009. "Governmental behavior in representative democracy: a synthesis of the theoretical literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(3), pages 447-465, December.
    6. Jean‐Michel Josselin & Yvon Rocaboy & Christophe Tavéra, 2009. "The influence of population size on the relevance of demand or supply models for local public goods: Evidence from France," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 88(3), pages 563-574, August.
    7. Kollias, Christos & Papadamou, Stephanos & Psarianos, Iacovos, 2014. "Fiscal imbalances and asymmetric adjustment under Labour and Conservative governments in the UK," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 208-213.
    8. Dashle Kelley, 2014. "The political economy of unfunded public pension liabilities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 21-38, January.
    9. Benoît Le Maux & Kristýna Dostálová & Fabio Padovano, 2020. "Ideology or voters? A quasi-experimental test of why left-wing governments spend more," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(1), pages 17-48, January.
    10. Ismael Sanz & Francisco J. Velázquez, 2003. "Fiscal illusion, fiscal consolidation and government expenditure composition in the OECD: a dynamic panel data approach," European Economy Group Working Papers 21, European Economy Group.

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