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The Effect of Number and Size of Interest Groups on Social Rent Dissipation

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  • Sun, Guang-Zhen
  • Ng, Yew-Kwang

Abstract

This paper develops two models of the lobbying of interest groups to examine the effect of the number and size of interest groups on rent dissipation. In cases where individuals ignore the effect of the lobbying activities on the rent size, the number of groups is negatively related to rent dissipation and there exists an inverse relation between the extent of egalitarianism of within-group rent sharing rules and the total rent dissipation in the symmetric setting. Model two examines the case where each individual in each group takes into account the effect of lobbying activities on the total "pie" of which she/he competes for a share through within-group and between-group interaction. The relation between the number of symmetric groups and the total rent dissipation is shown to be an inverted "U"-shape, contrary to the conventional wisdom that holds a monotonous relation between the two variables. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • Sun, Guang-Zhen & Ng, Yew-Kwang, 1999. "The Effect of Number and Size of Interest Groups on Social Rent Dissipation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 101(3-4), pages 251-265, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:101:y:1999:i:3-4:p:251-65
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hausken, Kjell, 1995. "The dynamics of within-group and between-group interaction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(7), pages 655-687.
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    Cited by:

    1. R. Kenneth Godwin & Edward J. López & Barry J. Seldon, 2006. "Incorporating Policymaker Costs and Political Competition into Rent‐Seeking Games," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 73(1), pages 37-54, July.
    2. Andrei Govorun, 2013. "The choice of lobbying strategy: direct contacts with officials or mediation via business associations," HSE Working papers WP BRP 24/EC/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    3. Epstein, Gil S. & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2004. "Strategic restraint in contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 201-210, February.
    4. Lisa Anderson & Beth Freeborn, 2010. "Varying the intensity of competition in a multiple prize rent seeking experiment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 143(1), pages 237-254, April.
    5. Abbas Khandan, 2022. "Externalities in the rent-seeking strategies of lobbying and bribery," Public Sector Economics, Institute of Public Finance, vol. 46(3), pages 421-450.
    6. Tverskoi, Denis & Senthilnathan, Athmanathan & Gavrilets, Sergey, 2021. "The dynamics of cooperation, power, and inequality in a group-structured society," SocArXiv 24svr, Center for Open Science.

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