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Imperfect Detection of Tax Evasion in a Corrupt Tax Administration

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Abstract

This article models the imperfect detection of tax evasion motivated by the existence of a corrupt tax administration. Consistent with previous literature, fines and audit probabilities both have a positive effect on compliance. Moreover, the model shows that they have a negative effect on the bribes paid to corrupt tax officials. More corruption decreases compliance levels, giving honest auditors incentives to work harder to detect evasion. Giving inspectors a share of the detected evasion (tax farming) makes auditors work harder; however, increasing their wages reduces their exerted effort to discover evasion. Higher compliance can as well be achieved by hiring more efficient inspectors. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

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  • Diego Escobari, 2012. "Imperfect Detection of Tax Evasion in a Corrupt Tax Administration," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 317-330, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:porgrv:v:12:y:2012:i:4:p:317-330
    DOI: 10.1007/s11115-011-0172-5
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    Cited by:

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    2. Temesgen Worku & Juan P. Mendoza & Jacco L. Wielhouwer, 2016. "Tariff evasion in sub-Saharan Africa: the influence of corruption in importing and exporting countries," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 23(4), pages 741-761, August.
    3. Emmanuel Yeboah-Assiamah, 2017. "‘Strong Personalities’ and ‘Strong Institutions’ Mediated by a ‘Strong Third Force’: Thinking ‘Systems’ in Corruption Control," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 545-562, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Taxation; Evasion; Corruption; Tax administration;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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