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Populism and Central Bank Independence: Comment

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  • Itai Agur

    (International Monetary Fund)

Abstract

Goodhart and Lastra (Open Econ Rev 29:49–68, 2018) lay out the mechanisms through which populist political movements may affect central bank independence. This paper provides the first empirical evidence that one aspect commonly attributed to populism, namely national identity politics, has indeed negatively impacted on central bank independence in developing countries. Combining existing datasets on central bank independence and political variables in developing countries, panel regressions are run for a sample of 113 countries during 1975–2012. Results prove robust to various specifications and macroeconomic as well as institutional control variables.

Suggested Citation

  • Itai Agur, 2018. "Populism and Central Bank Independence: Comment," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 687-693, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:openec:v:29:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s11079-018-9497-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s11079-018-9497-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Inglehart, Ronald F. & Norris, Pippa, 2016. "Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash," Working Paper Series 16-026, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    2. N. Nergiz Dincer & Barry Eichengreen, 2014. "Central Bank Transparency and Independence: Updates and New Measures," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 10(1), pages 189-259, March.
    3. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 6(3), pages 353-398, September.
    4. Mr. Marcel Peter & Mr. Scott Roger & Mr. Geoffrey M Heenan, 2006. "Implementing Inflation Targeting: Institutional Arrangements, Target Design, and Communications," IMF Working Papers 2006/278, International Monetary Fund.
    5. Ana Carolina Garriga, 2016. "Central Bank Independence in the World: A New Data Set," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(5), pages 849-868, October.
    6. Charles Goodhart & Rosa Lastra, 2018. "Populism and Central Bank Independence," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 49-68, February.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Carola Conces Binder, 2021. "Political Pressure on Central Banks," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(4), pages 715-744, June.
    2. Ferrara, Federico M. & Masciandaro, Donato & Moschella, Manuela & Romelli, Davide, 2022. "Political voice on monetary policy: Evidence from the parliamentary hearings of the European Central Bank," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    3. Lodge, David & Pérez, Javier J. & Albrizio, Silvia & Everett, Mary & De Bandt, Olivier & Georgiadis, Georgios & Ca' Zorzi, Michele & Lastauskas, Povilas & Carluccio, Juan & Parrága, Susana & Carvalho,, 2021. "The implications of globalisation for the ECB monetary policy strategy," Occasional Paper Series 263, European Central Bank.
    4. Garriga, Ana Carolina & Rodriguez, Cesar M., 2023. "Central bank independence and inflation volatility in developing countries," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 1320-1341.
    5. Donato Masciandaro, 2020. "Covid-19 Helicopter Money, Monetary Policy And Central Bank Independence: Economics And Politics," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 20137, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    6. Federico Faveretto & Donato Masciandaro, 2018. "Financial Inequality, group entitlements and populism," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1892, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    7. Donato Masciandaro, 2019. "Populism, Economic Policies, Political Pressure And Central Bank (In)Dependence," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19111, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    8. Fraccaroli, Nicolò & Giovannini, Alessandro & Jamet, Jean-Francois & Persson, Eric, 2022. "Ideology and monetary policy: the role of political parties’ stances in the ECB’s parliamentary hearings," Working Paper Series 2655, European Central Bank.
    9. Fraccaroli, Nicolò & Giovannini, Alessandro & Jamet, Jean-François & Persson, Eric, 2022. "Ideology and monetary policy. The role of political parties’ stances in the European Central Bank’s parliamentary hearings," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    10. Donato Masciandaro, 2020. "Ecb Helicopter Money: Economic And Political Economy Arithmetics," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 20138, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    11. Donato Masciandaro & Francesco Passarelli, 2020. "Populism, Political Pressure and Central Bank (in)Dependence," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 691-705, July.
    12. Oriola, Hugo, 2023. "Political monetary cycles: An empirical study," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    13. Federico Favaretto & Donato Masciandaro, 2022. "Populism, financial crises and banking policies: Economics and psychology," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 69(4), pages 441-464, September.
    14. D. Masciandaro, 2019. "What Bird Is That? Central Banking And Monetary Policy In The Last Forty Years," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19127, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    15. Federico M. Ferrara & Donato Masciandaro & Manuela Moschella & Davide Romelli, 2021. "Political Voice on Monetary Policy: Evidence from the Parliamentary Hearings of the European Central Bank," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21159, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    16. Rieder, Kilian, 2022. "Monetary policy decision-making by committee: Why, when and how it can work," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central bank independence; Monetary reform; Nationalism; Ethnic tension;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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