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International Financial Cooperation and the Number of Adherents: The Basel Committee and Capital Regulation

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  • John Pattison

Abstract

Theoretical analyses of international cooperation point to cooperation being optimized with a small number of participants. History is consistent with this view. However an anomaly is the international capital standards created by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). Basel I has over 100 adherents, and approximately that number of countries have been identified in a survey as candidates for Basel II. The author demonstrates that this is not an anomaly. First, Basel I was a product of a duopoly and then an oligopoly prior to approval by the BCBS. Secondly, self-interest and other factors explain why more than 100 countries have agreed to accept these standards. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2006

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  • John Pattison, 2006. "International Financial Cooperation and the Number of Adherents: The Basel Committee and Capital Regulation," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 443-458, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:openec:v:17:y:2006:i:4:p:443-458
    DOI: 10.1007/s11079-006-0358-6
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    Cited by:

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    2. Mohammad Bitar & M. Kabir Hassan & Kuntara Pukthuanthong & Thomas Walker, 2018. "The Performance of Islamic Vs. Conventional Banks: Evidence on the Suitability of the Basel Capital Ratios," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 29(5), pages 1003-1038, November.
    3. Gazi I. Kara, 2016. "Bank Capital Regulations Around the World : What Explains the Differences?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016-057, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    4. VanHoose, David, 2007. "Theories of bank behavior under capital regulation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(12), pages 3680-3697, December.
    5. David VanHoose, 2006. "Bank Behavior Under Capital Regulation: What Does The Academic Literature Tell Us?," NFI Working Papers 2006-WP-04, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.
    6. Edward Kane, 2007. "Connecting National Safety Nets: The Dialectics of the Basel II Contracting Process," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 35(4), pages 399-409, December.

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