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Sequential Product Design

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  • Sencer Ecer

    (LECG, LLC)

Abstract

I consider a model of duopoly where firms make sequential product design changes prior to price competition. I show that a socially desirable outcome is possible in this model. In equilibrium, the leader's product is less specific, implying a customer attraction strategy, and the follower's product is more specific, implying a customer retention strategy. This outcome is in contrast with the equilibrium outcome of a similar model, where simultaneous design competition takes place prior to price competition. In this latter model, the product designs are more specific and the prices are higher in equilibrium, leading to a reduction in welfare. I compare the design incentives under price competition with those in models where price collusion or merger is expected and with multi-product monopoly. In models with no price competition, less specific designs may serve to attract more customers, to improve current or future pie of monopoly profits, or to improve the outside option in bargaining game, depending on the model.

Suggested Citation

  • Sencer Ecer, 2003. "Sequential Product Design," Netnomics, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 33-42, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:netnom:v:5:y:2003:i:1:d:10.1023_a:1024946201804
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1024946201804
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    References listed on IDEAS

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