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Growing Skylines: The Economic Determinants of Skyscrapers in China

Author

Listed:
  • Jason Barr

    (Rutgers University-Newark)

  • Jingshu Luo

    (Le Moyne College)

Abstract

Since 1978, when China instituted economic reforms, cities throughout the country have embraced skyscraper construction. Despite their importance to the domestic economy, little is understood about what has been driving skyscraper heights and frequencies in China. This work explores the degree to which skyscraper construction patterns are the result of economic fundamentals, versus political factors and intercity competition. We find a strong economic rational across China, but we also find evidence of noneconomic factors. We show that incentives for political officials, such as career promotion, are helping to contribute to the growth in China’s skylines. We also find that small cities tend to overbuild skyscrapers. Spatial autoregression results further suggest some intercity competition, especially for those within the same tier.

Suggested Citation

  • Jason Barr & Jingshu Luo, 2021. "Growing Skylines: The Economic Determinants of Skyscrapers in China," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 210-248, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jrefec:v:63:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s11146-020-09764-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s11146-020-09764-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jedwab, Remi & Barr, Jason & Brueckner, Jan K., 2022. "Cities Without Skylines: Worldwide Building-Height Gaps and their Possible Determinants and Implications," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
    2. Lu, Jiaxuan, 2023. "The economics of China’s between-city height competition: A regression discontinuity approach," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).

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