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Governance, Conference Calls and CEO Compensation

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  • S. Price
  • Jesus Salas
  • C. Sirmans

Abstract

We study the relations between governance mechanisms (internal and external), conference call voluntary disclosures (incidence and length), and CEO compensation using hand-collected data on conference calls, corporate governance, and compensation. We hypothesize and show that institutions push for more frequent and longer conference calls in order to obtain more information with which to evaluate their investment. While independent directors push to hold conference calls, they may also prefer to have shorter conference calls to avoid potential lawsuits, proprietary costs, and/or loss of reputation that can arise from releasing too much information. Entrenched executives seek to minimize risk (such as employment and/or litigation risk) by limiting the length of conference calls or by avoiding conference calls altogether. In addition, contrary to recently proposed hypotheses, we find that executives do not receive additional compensation for bearing the risks of holding voluntary conference calls. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Suggested Citation

  • S. Price & Jesus Salas & C. Sirmans, 2015. "Governance, Conference Calls and CEO Compensation," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 181-206, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jrefec:v:50:y:2015:i:2:p:181-206
    DOI: 10.1007/s11146-014-9457-0
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    Cited by:

    1. S. McKay Price & Michael J. Seiler & Jiancheng Shen, 2017. "Do Investors Infer Vocal Cues from CEOs During Quarterly REIT Conference Calls?," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 54(4), pages 515-557, May.
    2. Zhilan Feng & Zhilu Lin & Wentao Wu, 2022. "CEO Influence on Funds from Operations (FFO) Adjustment for Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 65(3), pages 524-547, October.
    3. Borochin, Paul A. & Cicon, James E. & DeLisle, R. Jared & Price, S. McKay, 2018. "The effects of conference call tones on market perceptions of value uncertainty," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 75-91.
    4. Nadia Cardoso Moreira & Felipe Ramos & Juliana Kozak-Rogo & Rafael Rogo, 2016. "Conference Calls: an Empirical Analysis of Information Content and the Type of Disclosed News," Brazilian Business Review, Fucape Business School, vol. 13(6), pages 291-315, November.
    5. Francois Brochet & Kalin Kolev & Alina Lerman, 2018. "Information transfer and conference calls," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 907-957, September.
    6. Zifeng Feng & William G. Hardin & Zhonghua Wu, 2024. "REIT Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Compensation in the New Era," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 69(4), pages 651-681, November.
    7. Md Helal Uddin*, 2024. "CEO Compensation and Earnings Management-The Moderating Role of COVID-19 Pandemic: Evidence from Bangladesh," International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science, International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS), vol. 8(1), pages 1605-1622, January.
    8. Schnaubelt, Matthias & Seifert, Oleg, 2020. "Valuation ratios, surprises, uncertainty or sentiment: How does financial machine learning predict returns from earnings announcements?," FAU Discussion Papers in Economics 04/2020, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Institute for Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voluntary disclosure; Conference calls; Governance; Compensation; Entrenchment; Institutions; REITs; D80; D82; G10; G30; G32; G34;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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