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Unitary, Divisional, And Matrix Forms As Political Governance Systems

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  • Andrew Whitford

Abstract

In this study I reassess a set of fundamental organization forms (unitary, divisional, and matrix) as agenda-setting and political governance systems. My method of analysis is based on how political scientists study agendas in committees. Specifically, I first recount that moving from a functional (unitary) to a product-line (divisional) structure increases the types of conflict referred from lower to higher levels of the hierarchy, but does not increase the amount of conflict referred. I then show that moving from a product-line to a matrix structure increases the amount and the types of conflict referred to higher levels of the hierarchy; that it is possible in matrix forms that no conflict is resolved at the lowest levels of the hierarchy; and, that accountability is reduced for those who are able to refer conflict. The study reveals implications for matrix forms that derive from this view of organizations as agenda-setting and political governance systems. This analysis fits with the recent history of matrix forms in a variety of organizations. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew Whitford, 2006. "Unitary, Divisional, And Matrix Forms As Political Governance Systems," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 10(4), pages 435-454, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:10:y:2006:i:4:p:435-454
    DOI: 10.1007/s10997-006-9009-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Marian Döhler, 2017. "The Bias of Structures: How Multidivisional Organizations Work in the Public Sector," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 83-100, March.
    2. Krzysztof Gos, 2015. "The Key Advantages and Disadvantages of Matrix Organizational Structures (Kluczowe zalety i ograniczenia macierzowych struktur organizacyjnych)," Research Reports, University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management, vol. 2(19), pages 66-83.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    agenda-setting; authority; conflict resolution; hierarchy; matrix; D23; L22; L23;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production

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