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Shareholders’ Voting at General Meetings: Evidence from the Netherlands

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  • Abe Jong
  • Gerard Mertens
  • Peter Roosenboom

Abstract

We study annual general meetings of shareholders in the Netherlands. The Dutch corporate governance system is characterized by relatively concentrated shareholdings and large stakes owned by pension funds, banks and insurance companies. The legal protection of shareholders is poor due to the presence of takeover defenses, such as certificates, which deprive shareholders from their voting rights. An analysis of the minutes of 245 general meetings in the period 1998–2002 reveals that on average 30% of the equity capital is represented at the meeting. All proposals at the meeting are sponsored by the management and only 9 out of 1,583 proposals are rejected or withdrawn. Our analyses show that pension funds are the most active and critical shareholders at the meetings, while certificates effectively restrict shareholder rights. Our main conclusion is that the general meetings do not provide shareholders in the Netherlands any significant influence on management. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Abe Jong & Gerard Mertens & Peter Roosenboom, 2006. "Shareholders’ Voting at General Meetings: Evidence from the Netherlands," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 10(4), pages 353-380, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:10:y:2006:i:4:p:353-380
    DOI: 10.1007/s10997-006-9006-1
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    Cited by:

    1. Luiz Henrique F. Vargas & Patrícia M. Bortolon & Lucas A. B. C. Barros & Ricardo P. C. Leal, 2018. "Recent activism initiatives in Brazil," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 15(1), pages 40-50, February.
    2. Peter Cziraki & Luc Renneboog & Peter G. Szilagyi, 2010. "Shareholder Activism through Proxy Proposals: The European Perspective," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 16(5), pages 738-777, November.
    3. Renneboog, Luc & Szilagyi, Peter G., 2020. "How relevant is dividend policy under low shareholder protection?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    4. Peter Cziraki & Prof. Dr. Luc Renneboog & Peter de Goeij, 2010. "Insider Trading, Option Exercises and Private Benefits of Control," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1006, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    5. Shakti Deb & Indrajit Dube, 2017. "Corporate Governance Disclosure for Complex Ownership Structure in India," Indian Journal of Corporate Governance, , vol. 10(2), pages 143-175, December.
    6. Chris Mallin, 2012. "Institutional investors: the vote as a tool of governance," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 16(2), pages 177-196, May.
    7. Tsukioka, Yasutomo, 2020. "The impact of Japan’s stewardship code on shareholder voting," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 148-162.
    8. Chris Mallin & Andrea Melis, 2012. "Shareholder rights, shareholder voting, and corporate performance," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 16(2), pages 171-176, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    General meetings; Corporate governance; G32; G34; K22;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

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