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Cartelization, Cartel Breakdown, and Price Behavior: Evidence from the German Cement Industry

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  • Kai Hüschelrath
  • Tobias Veith

Abstract

We use a unique dataset of about 340,000 market transactions from 36 smaller and larger customers of German cement producers to study the price behavior before and after the breakdown of a German cement cartel. We find that, first, while the cartel agreement was active, cartel members set higher list prices than non-cartel members; however, larger rebates granted by the cartel members led to similar transaction prices. Second, after the cartel breakdown, both cartel- and non-cartel members reduced transaction prices to a far larger extent than list prices. We build on these results and discuss implications for competition policy. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Suggested Citation

  • Kai Hüschelrath & Tobias Veith, 2016. "Cartelization, Cartel Breakdown, and Price Behavior: Evidence from the German Cement Industry," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 81-100, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jincot:v:16:y:2016:i:1:p:81-100
    DOI: 10.1007/s10842-015-0204-x
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Marcel Boyer & Anne Catherine Faye & Éric Gravel & Rachidi Kotchoni, 2019. "Guiding Principles in Setting Cartel Sanctions (The Working Paper Version)," CIRANO Working Papers 2019s-18, CIRANO.
    2. Kusuma, Ravi Teja & Hiremath, Rahul B. & Rajesh, Pachimatla & Kumar, Bimlesh & Renukappa, Suresh, 2022. "Sustainable transition towards biomass-based cement industry: A review," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
    3. Matthias Hunold & Kai Hüschelrath & Ulrich Laitenberger & Johannes Muthers, 2020. "Competition, Collusion, and Spatial Sales Patterns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(4), pages 737-779, December.
    4. Joseph E. Harrington & Kai Hüschelrath & Ulrich Laitenberger, 2018. "Rent sharing to control noncartel supply in the German cement market," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(1), pages 149-166, March.
    5. Ghulam, Yaseen, 2021. "Institutions and firms’ technological changes and productivity growth," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 171(C).
    6. Boyer, Marcel & Faye, Anne Catherine & Kotchoni, Rachidi, 2017. "Challenges and Pitfalls in Cartel Policy and Fining," TSE Working Papers 17-852, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    7. Griffiths, Steve & Sovacool, Benjamin K. & Furszyfer Del Rio, Dylan D. & Foley, Aoife M. & Bazilian, Morgan D. & Kim, Jinsoo & Uratani, Joao M., 2023. "Decarbonizing the cement and concrete industry: A systematic review of socio-technical systems, technological innovations, and policy options," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 180(C).
    8. Bovin, Andreas & Bos, Iwan, 2023. "Market Shares as Collusive Marker: Evidence from the European Truck Industry," Research Memorandum 011, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Competition policy; Price behavior; Cartels; Cement; List prices; Rebates; L12; L21; L41; L61; K21;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L61 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Metals and Metal Products; Cement; Glass; Ceramics
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

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