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EU State Aid Policy and the Politics of External Trade Relations

Author

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  • Chad Damro

Abstract

European Union (EU) state aid policy has an oft-overlooked but politically-charged external dimension that is most clearly witnessed in the linkage with external trade relations. The article seeks to illuminate the issues and potential problems raised by this state aid-trade linkage. When this linkage is made, the EU engages in an array of complex international interactions through which it may pursue two politically-contentious procedures: countervailing duties or dispute settlement. The article argues that an understanding of the EU’s role in these complex interactions must take into account the Union’s institutional landscape and the competing preferences of different private interests. When deciding to impose countervailing duties against foreign state aids (subsidies), private interests play a significant role in initiating investigations and can use their access to EU institutions to encourage the imposition of such measures. While a variety of factors help to explain why the EU prefers pursuing countervailing duties, the Union also actively uses the World Trade Organization’s formal dispute settlement mechanism. Under this alternative, private interests again play an important role, pursuing varying strategies depending on their preferences. The most important determinant of a firm’s preference to pursue countervailing duties or the dispute settlement mechanism appears to be the extent to which the firm is concerned with restoring competition in their home market or with restoring competition in multiple/global markets. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Chad Damro, 2013. "EU State Aid Policy and the Politics of External Trade Relations," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 159-170, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jincot:v:13:y:2013:i:1:p:159-170
    DOI: 10.1007/s10842-012-0139-4
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    1. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/f5vtl5h9a73d5ls976m34ikh5 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Cornelia Woll, 2009. "Who Captures Whom? Trade Policy Lobbying in the European Union," Post-Print hal-00972851, HAL.
    3. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/f5vtl5h9a73d5ls976m34ikh5 is not listed on IDEAS
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