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Resolving Indeterminacy in Coordination Games: A New Approach Applied to a Pay-as-you-go Pension Scheme

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  • Luigi Bonatti

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  • Luigi Bonatti, 2007. "Resolving Indeterminacy in Coordination Games: A New Approach Applied to a Pay-as-you-go Pension Scheme," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 91(3), pages 273-295, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:91:y:2007:i:3:p:273-295
    DOI: 10.1007/s00712-007-0256-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
    2. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September.
    3. Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Beil, Richard O, 1990. "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 234-248, March.
    4. R. Guesnerie, 2002. "Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 439-480, March.
    5. Roger Guesnerie, 2005. "Strategic Substitutabilities Versus Strategic Complementarities : Towards a General Theory of Expectational Coordination ?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 115(4), pages 393-412.
    6. Guo, Jang-Ting & Harrison, Sharon G., 2004. "Balanced-budget rules and macroeconomic (in)stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 119(2), pages 357-363, December.
    7. Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie & Uribe, Martin, 1997. "Balanced-Budget Rules, Distortionary Taxes, and Aggregate Instability," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(5), pages 976-1000, October.
    8. Cass, David & Shell, Karl, 1983. "Do Sunspots Matter?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(2), pages 193-227, April.
    9. Kim, Youngse, 1996. "Equilibrium Selection inn-Person Coordination Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 203-227, August.
    10. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2001. "Rethinking Multiple Equilibria in Macroeconomic Modeling," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, Volume 15, pages 139-182, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Guesnerie, Roger, 1992. "An Exploration of the Eductive Justifications of the Rational-Expectations Hypothesis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1254-1278, December.
    12. Vives, Xavier, 2004. "Complementarities and Games: New Developments," CEPR Discussion Papers 4742, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. John B. Van Huyck & Raymond C. Battalio & Richard O. Beil, 1991. "Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(3), pages 885-910.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    equilibrium selection; principle of insufficient reason; rational beliefs; eductive viewpoint; global games; D8; H55;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions

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