Entry regulation and social welfare with an integer problem
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DOI: 10.1007/BF01227496
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Citations
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Cited by:
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- Gu, Yiquan & Wenzel, Tobias, 2012. "Price-dependent demand in spatial models," DICE Discussion Papers 43, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Haraguchi, Junichi & Matsumura, Toshihiro, 2020. "Lack of commitment to future privatization policies may lead to worst welfare outcome," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 181-187.
- Adam T. Jones, 2016. "Mileage tax, property tax, sales tax, or fee: the best way to pay for commercial infrastructure that isn’t free," Review of Regional Research: Jahrbuch für Regionalwissenschaft, Springer;Gesellschaft für Regionalforschung (GfR), vol. 36(1), pages 81-98, February.
- Susumu Cato & Toshihiro Matsumura, 2019.
"Entry License Tax: Stackelberg versus Cournot,"
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- Cato, Susumu & Matsumura, Toshihiro, 2013. "Entry-License Tax: Stackelberg versus Cournot," MPRA Paper 81297, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 12 Sep 2017.
- Matsumura Toshihiro & Okumura Yasunori, 2017. "Privatization Neutrality Theorem in Free Entry Markets," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(2), pages 1-9, June.
- Ikuo Ishibashi & Noriaki Matsushima, 2006. "Inviting entrants may help incumbent firms," Discussion Papers 2006-46, Kobe University, Graduate School of Business Administration.
- Yiquan Gu & Alexander Rasch & Tobias Wenzel, 2016.
"Price-sensitive demand and market entry,"
Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 95(4), pages 865-875, November.
- Gu, Yiquan & Rasch, Alexander & Wenzel, Tobias, 2014. "Price-sensitive demand and market entry," DICE Discussion Papers 165, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Hainz Christa, 2004.
"Are Transition Countries Overbanked? The Effect of Institutions on Bank Market Entry,"
German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2), pages 237-256, May.
- Christa Hainz, 2004. "Are Transition Countries Overbanked? The Effect of Institutions on Bank Market Entry," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 5(2), pages 237-256, May.
- Ming Chung Chang & Hsiao‐Ping Peng, 2009. "Structure Regulation, Price Structure, Cross‐Subsidization And Marginal Cost Of Public Funds," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 77(6), pages 675-698, December.
- Keisuke Hattori & Takeshi Yoshikawa, 2016.
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- Hattori, Keisuke & Yoshikawa, Takeshi, 2013. "Free Entry and Social Inefficiency under Co-opetition," MPRA Paper 44816, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Gu, Yiquan & Wenzel, Tobias, 2009.
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International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 567-571, September.
- Gu, Yiquan & Wenzel, Tobias, 2007. "A Note on the Excess Entry Theorem in Spatial Models with Elastic Demand," Ruhr Economic Papers 33, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
- Toshihiro Matsumura, 2003.
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Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 36(4), pages 1007-1025, November.
- Toshihiro Matsumura, 2003. "Consumer‐benefiting exclusive territories," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(4), pages 1007-1025, November.
- Francisco Galera & Pedro Garcia-del-Barrio, 2011. "Excessive entry and the integer constraint with many firms: a note," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 103(3), pages 271-287, July.
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More about this item
Keywords
entry regulation; excess entry; integer problem; L13; L51;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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