IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/jeczfn/v59y1994i1p1-21.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The scope for collusion under fractional defections

Author

Listed:
  • Dick Damania

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Dick Damania, 1994. "The scope for collusion under fractional defections," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 1-21, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:59:y:1994:i:1:p:1-21
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01225930
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF01225930
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/BF01225930?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
    2. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December.
    3. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Matthias Blonski & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2015. "Prisoners’ other Dilemma," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(1), pages 61-81, February.
    2. Bård Harstad & Francesco Lancia & Alessia Russo, 2019. "Compliance Technology and Self-enforcing Agreements," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 1-29.
    3. Zissimos, Ben, 2007. "The GATT and gradualism," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 410-433, April.
    4. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 1996. "Multimarket Contact, Concavity, and Collusion: on Extremal Equilibria of Interdependent Supergames," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 104, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 30 Nov 1998.
    5. Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 1073-1225, Elsevier.
    6. Andersson, Fredrik & Skogh, Goran, 2003. "Quality, self-regulation, and competition: the case of insurance," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 267-280, April.
    7. Flochel, Laurent & Versaevel, Bruno & de Villemeur, Étienne, 2009. "Optimal Collusion with Limited Liability and Policy Implications," TSE Working Papers 09-027, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jul 2011.
    8. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2005. "Managerial incentives and collusive behavior," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1501-1523, August.
    9. Wilson, Alistair J. & Wu, Hong, 2017. "At-will relationships: How an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 487-507.
    10. Van Kolpin & Mark Stater, 2013. "The Real Deal? Information Asymmetries and Tuition Discounting in Higher Education," Review of Economic Analysis, Digital Initiatives at the University of Waterloo Library, vol. 5(2), pages 190-212, December.
    11. van Damme, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 206-217, February.
    12. Matthias Blonski & Peter Ockenfels & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2011. "Equilibrium Selection in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Axiomatic Approach and Experimental Evidence," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 164-192, August.
    13. Schultz, Christian, 1997. "Wages and employment in a repeated game with revenue fluctuations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 147-162, January.
    14. Dou, Winston Wei & Ji, Yan & Wu, Wei, 2021. "Competition, profitability, and discount rates," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(2), pages 582-620.
    15. Andersson, Ola, 2008. "On the role of patience in collusive Bertrand duopolies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 60-63, July.
    16. Herrendorf, Berthold, 1998. "Inflation Targeting as a Way of Precommitment," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 431-448, July.
    17. Hamilton, Jonathan & Slutsky, Steven, 2004. "Nonlinear price discrimination with a finite number of consumers and constrained recontracting," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 737-757, June.
    18. Zaki Wahhaj, 2012. "Social Norms, Higher-Order Beliefs and the Emperor's New Clothes," Studies in Economics 1210, School of Economics, University of Kent.
    19. Lu, Yuanzhu & Wright, Julian, 2010. "Tacit collusion with price-matching punishments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 298-306, May.
    20. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 1999. "On Interdependent Supergames: Multimarket Contact, Concavity, and Collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 127-139, November.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:59:y:1994:i:1:p:1-21. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.