Firm’s tax evasion in a principal-agent model with self-protection
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DOI: 10.1007/s00712-012-0306-4
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Cited by:
- Marchese, Carla & Venturini, Andrea, 2017. "Is there any Induced Demand for Tax Evasion?," IEL Working Papers 22, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
- Thomas Bauer & Thomas Kourouxous & Peter Krenn, 2018. "Taxation and agency conflicts between firm owners and managers: a review," Business Research, Springer;German Academic Association for Business Research, vol. 11(1), pages 33-76, February.
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More about this item
Keywords
Tax evasion; Firm; Agency; Risk aversion; H26; H32; D81; K42;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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