IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/jbuset/v129y2015i2p491-510.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Tunneling or Not? The Change of Legal Environment on the Effect of Post-Privatization Performance

Author

Listed:
  • Guoqian Tu
  • Frank Yu

Abstract

Motivated by Hoff and Stiglitz’s (Am Econ Rev 94(3):753–763, 2004 ) theory, we examine empirically how the creation of “rules of the game” affect the behavior of economic agents in a transition economy. Using a sample of Chinese state-owned enterprises in which controlling ownership was transferred to private acquirers between 1994 and 2006, we find that the post-privatization performance (PPP) of firms depends on institutional factors. Before 2003, we observe severe post-privatization tunneling behaviors by acquirers and worse PPP. However, from 2003, when the State issued regulations against tunneling and strengthened enforcement, the incidence of tunneling behaviors declined, and PPP improved. We find that better implementation of ownership transfer and longer prior experience of private acquirers are key factors that contribute to the improvement. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Guoqian Tu & Frank Yu, 2015. "Tunneling or Not? The Change of Legal Environment on the Effect of Post-Privatization Performance," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 129(2), pages 491-510, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jbuset:v:129:y:2015:i:2:p:491-510
    DOI: 10.1007/s10551-014-2169-9
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10551-014-2169-9
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10551-014-2169-9?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Simon Johnson & Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "Privatization and Corporate Governance," NBER Chapters, in: Governance, Regulation, and Privatization in the Asia-Pacific Region, pages 13-29, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Rousseau, Peter L. & Xiao, Sheng, 2008. "Change of control and the success of China's share-issue privatization," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 605-613, December.
    3. Karla Hoff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2004. "After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Societies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 753-763, June.
    4. Allen, Franklin & Qian, Jun & Qian, Meijun, 2005. "Law, finance, and economic growth in China," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 57-116, July.
    5. Chen, Gongmeng & Firth, Michael & Rui, Oliver, 2006. "Have China's enterprise reforms led to improved efficiency and profitability?," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 82-109, March.
    6. Megginson, William L & Nash, Robert C & van Randenborgh, Matthias, 1994. "The Financial and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: An International Empirical Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(2), pages 403-452, June.
    7. Chen, Gongmeng & Firth, Michael & Xin, Yu & Xu, Liping, 2008. "Control Transfers, Privatization, and Corporate Performance: Efficiency Gains in China's Listed Companies," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 43(1), pages 161-190, March.
    8. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, April.
    9. Huang, Zhangkai & Wang, Kun, 2011. "Ultimate privatization and change in firm performance: Evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 121-132, March.
    10. Cheung, Yan-Leung & Rau, P. Raghavendra & Stouraitis, Aris, 2006. "Tunneling, propping, and expropriation: evidence from connected party transactions in Hong Kong," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 343-386, November.
    11. Atanasov, Vladimir & Black, Bernard & Ciccotello, Conrad & Gyoshev, Stanley, 2010. "How does law affect finance? An examination of equity tunneling in Bulgaria," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 155-173, April.
    12. Jeffry M. Netter & William L. Megginson, 2001. "From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 321-389, June.
    13. Peng, Winnie Qian & Wei, K.C. John & Yang, Zhishu, 2011. "Tunneling or propping: Evidence from connected transactions in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 306-325, April.
    14. repec:bla:jfinan:v:53:y:1998:i:3:p:1081-1110 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Jiang, Guohua & Lee, Charles M.C. & Yue, Heng, 2010. "Tunneling through intercorporate loans: The China experience," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 1-20, October.
    16. Atanasov, Vladimir, 2005. "How much value can blockholders tunnel? Evidence from the Bulgarian mass privatization auctions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 191-234, April.
    17. Zuobao Wei & Oscar Varela & Juliet D'Souza & M. Kabir Hassan, 2003. "The Financial and Operating Performance of China's Newly Privatized Firms," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 32(2), Summer.
    18. Cheung, Yan-Leung & Qi, Yuehua & Raghavendra Rau, P. & Stouraitis, Aris, 2009. "Buy high, sell low: How listed firms price asset transfers in related party transactions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 914-924, May.
    19. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon & Lang, Larry H. P., 2000. "The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 81-112.
    20. Li, Guoping, 2010. "The pervasiveness and severity of tunneling by controlling shareholders in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 310-323, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Yusen Dong & Pengcheng Ma & Lanzhu Sun & Daniel Han Ming Chng, 2024. "Goodwill Hunting: Why and When Ultimate Controlling Owners Affect Their Firms’ Corporate Social Responsibility Performance," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 193(3), pages 535-553, September.
    2. Chen, Yinghui & Du, Julan, 2020. "Does regulatory reform of cumulative voting promote a more balanced power distribution in the boardroom?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    3. Luo, Danglun & Piao, Zhirong & Wu, Cen & Zhang, Frank Feida, 2024. "Collateral damage: Evidence from share pledging in China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ma, Liangbo & Ma, Shiguang & Tian, Gary, 2013. "Political connections, founder-managers, and their impact on tunneling in China's listed firms," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 312-339.
    2. Lihui Tian & Saul Estrin, 2005. "Retained State Shareholding in Chinese PLCs: Does Government Ownership Reduce Corporate Value?," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp750, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    3. Fuxiu Jiang & Kenneth A Kim, 2020. "Corporate Governance in China: A Survey [The role of boards of directors in corporate governance: a conceptual framework and survey]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 24(4), pages 733-772.
    4. Li, Bo & Megginson, William L. & Shen, Zhe & Sun, Qian, 2019. "Privatization effect versus listing effect: Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 369-394.
    5. Huang, Zhangkai & Wang, Kun, 2011. "Ultimate privatization and change in firm performance: Evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 121-132, March.
    6. Liu, Qigui & Luo, Tianpei & Tian, Gary Gang, 2015. "Family control and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 220-245.
    7. Shailer, Greg & Wang, Kun, 2015. "Government ownership and the cost of debt for Chinese listed corporations," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(C), pages 1-17.
    8. Lars Helge Haß & Sofia Johan & Maximilian André Müller, 2016. "The Effectiveness of Public Enforcement: Evidence from the Resolution of Tunneling in China," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 134(4), pages 649-668, April.
    9. Amon Chizema & Wei Jiang & Jing-Ming Kuo & Xiaoqi Song, 2020. "Mutual funds, tunneling and firm performance: evidence from China," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 355-387, July.
    10. Luo, Danglun & Piao, Zhirong & Wu, Cen & Zhang, Frank Feida, 2024. "Collateral damage: Evidence from share pledging in China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    11. Cai, Guilong & Xie, Sujuan & Xu, Yue & Zeng, Yamin & Zhang, Junsheng, 2019. "Ultimate parent's board reform and controlling shareholder entrenchment: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 389-403.
    12. Zhang, Han & Li, Minghui & Yang, Yujie, 2024. "Does common institutional ownership constrain related party transactions? Evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 93(PB), pages 1015-1042.
    13. Jiang, Fuxiu & Cai, Xinni & Nofsinger, John R. & Zheng, Xiaojia, 2020. "Can reputation concern restrain bad news hoarding in family firms?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    14. Bansal, Shashank & Thenmozhi, M., 2020. "Does Concentrated Founder Ownership Affect Related Party Transactions? Evidence from an Emerging Economy," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).
    15. Piotroski, Joseph D. & Zhang, Tianyu, 2014. "Politicians and the IPO decision: The impact of impending political promotions on IPO activity in China," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 111-136.
    16. Xingqiang Du, 2015. "Does Confucianism Reduce Minority Shareholder Expropriation? Evidence from China," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 132(4), pages 661-716, December.
    17. Donghua Chen & Xuerui Wei & Huimin Wang, 2022. "Controlling shareholder’s ownership, control rights and related-party transactions – analysis of regulatory effects based on board characteristics," International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 1577-1604, December.
    18. Xingqiang Du, 2014. "Does Religion Mitigate Tunneling? Evidence from Chinese Buddhism," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 125(2), pages 299-327, December.
    19. Ljungqvist, Alexander & Chen, Donghua & Lu, Haitian & Jiang, Dequan & Zhou, Mingming, 2015. "State Capitalism vs. Private Enterprise," CEPR Discussion Papers 10423, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Jiang, Guohua & Lee, Charles M.C. & Yue, Heng, 2010. "Tunneling through intercorporate loans: The China experience," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 1-20, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tunneling; Privatization; Investor protection; Law and finance; Ethics; G34; M13; N25; N45;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • M13 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - New Firms; Startups
    • N25 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Asia including Middle East
    • N45 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Asia including Middle East

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:jbuset:v:129:y:2015:i:2:p:491-510. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.