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What can ants tell us about collective behavior during a natural catastrophe?

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Listed:
  • Deby Cassill
  • Alexander Casella
  • Jaeson Clayborn
  • Matthew Perry
  • Michael Lagarde

Abstract

The fire ant, Solenipsis invicta, has successfully invaded and colonized ecosystems worldwide. Like humans, fire ants build permanent domiciles to house family members, establish well-defined territories for foraging and fight to the death when invading neighbors breach the borders. One of the more striking behaviors of fire ants is their ability to form a living raft when springtime rains flood their domiciles. What are the survival benefits, if any, to collective behavior during a flood? To address this question, we quantified the survival of individuals as solitary swimmers compared to cooperative rafters. We found that large workers and matriarchs survived equally well as solitary swimmers or rafters. In contrast, small workers drowned whether they were solitary swimmers or rafters. However, when rafting with large workers or matriarchs, the mortality of small workers declined three-fold. We propose a behavior phenotype classification scheme to catalog the diverse behaviors observed in this series of experiments. Although the ultimate goal of rafting behavior by fire ant workers is to protect their matriarch, the proximate goal for the vast majority of fire ants is to save themselves first and to save others if the opportunity arises. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Deby Cassill & Alexander Casella & Jaeson Clayborn & Matthew Perry & Michael Lagarde, 2015. "What can ants tell us about collective behavior during a natural catastrophe?," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 255-270, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jbioec:v:17:y:2015:i:3:p:255-270
    DOI: 10.1007/s10818-015-9195-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Runge, Carlisle Ford, 1986. "Common property and collective action in economic development," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 14(5), pages 623-635, May.
    2. Elinor Ostrom, 2000. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 137-158, Summer.
    3. Deby Cassill, 2006. "Why Skew Selection, a Model of Parental Exploitation, Should Replace Kin Selection," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 101-119, August.
    4. Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler, 2001. "Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(3), pages 869-896, September.
    5. Deby Cassill & Alison Watkins, 2010. "The evolution of cooperative hierarchies through natural selection processes," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 29-42, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jennifer Fewell, 2015. "Social Biomimicry: what do ants and bees tell us about organization in the natural world?," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 207-216, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Self-organization; Division of labor; Solenopsis invicta ; A13; B49; B59; C72; C91; D63; D64; J16; Z13;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
    • B49 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Other
    • B59 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Other
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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