Float like a butterfly, $${\varvec{decide}}$$ d e c i d e like a bee
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DOI: 10.1007/s10818-015-9204-5
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More about this item
Keywords
Honeybee Apis mellifera ; Bounded rationality ; Collective intelligence/group intelligence; Superorganism ; Apis oeconomicus ; D03; D70;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
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