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Political Fragmentation and the Evolution of National Tax Structures in the OECD

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  • John Ashworth
  • Bruno Heyndels

Abstract

This paper considers how tax structures in OECD countries change over time and how these changes are related to political fragmentation. Tax structures amongst OECD countries have become more uniform in the recent past (1965–1995) but it is less clear that this convergence satisfies time-series requirements. Evidence on stochastic convergence tends to suggest that there is evidence of persistence of shocks remaining over a considerable time period. A consideration of the countries where this persistence is most prevalent shows that there is significant correlation between high persistence and weak (coalition) governments, giving further weight to the theories of weak government. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

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  • John Ashworth & Bruno Heyndels, 2001. "Political Fragmentation and the Evolution of National Tax Structures in the OECD," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 8(4), pages 377-393, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:8:y:2001:i:4:p:377-393
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1011210722342
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    2. Osterloh, Steffen & Debus, Marc, 2009. "Partisan politics in corporate tax competition," ZEW Discussion Papers 09-078, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    3. Osterloh, Steffen & Debus, Marc, 2012. "Partisan politics in corporate taxation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 192-207.
    4. Åsa Hansson & Susan Porter & Susan Williams, 2015. "The importance of the political process on corporate tax policy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 281-306, September.
    5. Bharatee Dash & Angara Raja, 2014. "Do political determinants affect revenue collection? Evidence from the Indian states," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 61(3), pages 253-278, September.
    6. Huber, Gerald & Kocher, Martin & Sutter, Matthias, 2003. "Government Strength, Power Dispersion in Governments and Budget Deficits in OECD-Countries: A Voting Power Approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(3-4), pages 333-350, September.
    7. Roberto Ricciuti, 2004. "Political Fragmentation and Fiscal Outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 118(3_4), pages 365-388, March.
    8. Miroslav Beblavý, 2011. "Why has the crisis been bad for private pensions, but good for the flat tax? The sustainability of ‘neoliberal’ reforms in the new EU member states," CEPS Papers 6313, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    9. Peter Schwarz, 2007. "Does capital mobility reduce the corporate-labor tax ratio?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 363-380, March.
    10. Ruiz, Fernando & Gerard, Marcel, 2008. "Is there evidence of strategic corporate tax interaction among EU countries?," MPRA Paper 10094, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Asatryan, Zareh & Baskaran, Thushyanthan & Heinemann, Friedrich, 2017. "The effect of direct democracy on the level and structure of local taxes," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 38-55.
    12. Joaquín Artés & Ignacio Jurado, 2018. "Government fragmentation and fiscal deficits: a regression discontinuity approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(3), pages 367-391, June.
    13. Hansson, Åsa & Porter, Susan & Perry Williams, Susan, 2012. "The Effect of Political and Economic Factors on Corporate Tax Rates," Working Paper Series 942, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    14. Hans Pitlik, 2005. "Folgt die Steuerpolitik in der EU der Logik des Steuerwettbewerbs," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 256/2005, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany.

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