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Mixed Tax Systems and the Public Provision of Private Goods

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  • Alessandro Balestrino

Abstract

In contrast to what used to be conventional wisdom among economists,several recent contributions have shown that in-kind transfersschemes can be welfare-improving in the presence of distortionarytaxes (usually, linear taxes or a general income tax). In thisnote, we extend previous work by considering the most generaltax system compatible with reasonable information constraints,i.e. a mix of linear indirect and non-linear direct taxes. Threemain results are noted. We find that in the presence of a mixedtax system (as opposed to the non-linear income tax alone): i) not only encouraged but also discouraged goods satisfy a conditionfor the desirability of public provision; ii) there is a tendencyfor the optimal level of in-kind transfers to be lower; iii)there is a basic equivalence between uniform and income-contingentin-kind transfers. We also show how previous results can be derivedas special cases of ours and others have to be modified to accountfor the mixed tax system. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

Suggested Citation

  • Alessandro Balestrino, 2000. "Mixed Tax Systems and the Public Provision of Private Goods," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 7(4), pages 463-478, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:7:y:2000:i:4:p:463-478
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1008729304743
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    Cited by:

    1. Alessandro Balestrino & Lisa Grazzini & Annalisa Luporini, 2017. "A normative justification of compulsory education," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 30(2), pages 537-567, April.
    2. Bastani, Spencer & Blomquist, Sören & Micheletto, Luca, 2010. "Public Provision of Private Goods, Tagging and Optimal Income Taxation with Heterogeneity in Needs," Working Paper Series, Center for Fiscal Studies 2010:14, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    3. Spencer Bastani & Sören Blomquist & Luca Micheletto, 2019. "Nonlinear and piecewise linear income taxation, and the subsidization of work-related goods," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(4), pages 806-834, August.
    4. Alessandra Casarico & Luca Micheletto & Alessandro Sommacal, 2015. "Intergenerational transmission of skills during childhood and optimal public policy," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 28(2), pages 353-372, April.
    5. Luciano G. Greco, 2011. "Optimal Redistribution with Productive Social Services," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 113(1), pages 55-73, March.
    6. Sören Blomquist & Vidar Christiansen & Luca Micheletto, 2010. "Public Provision of Private Goods and Nondistortionary Marginal Tax Rates," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 1-27, May.

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