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Tax Evasion, Risky Laundering, and Optimal Deterrence Policy

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  • Gideon Yaniv

Abstract

This paper extends the Allingham and Sandmo's (1972) model of income tax evasion to take account of laundering opportunities, allowing the taxpayer to determine not only the amount of actual income to declare but also the amount of undeclared income to launder. Laundering, aside of entailing direct costs, is assumed to be an unlawful activity, subject to the risk of detection and punishment. The tax authorities devote separate resource efforts to initial audits which may detect undeclared income that has not been laundered and to in-depth investigation which may detect undeclared income that has been laundered. The paper analyzes the effects of laundering incentives on evasion and derives guidelines for the optimal design of a joint evasion/laundering deterrence policy. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999

Suggested Citation

  • Gideon Yaniv, 1999. "Tax Evasion, Risky Laundering, and Optimal Deterrence Policy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 6(1), pages 27-38, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:6:y:1999:i:1:p:27-38
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1008643703122
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ralph-C. Bayer, 2006. "Finding Out Who The Crooks Are — Tax Evasion With Sequential Auditing," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 51(02), pages 195-227.
    2. Bayer, Ralph-C & Sutter, Matthias, 2009. "The excess burden of tax evasion--An experimental detection-concealment contest," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(5), pages 527-543, July.
    3. Maria Felice Arezzo, 2014. "Il lavoro irregolare nelle regioni italiane: un?analisi econometrica dal 1995 al 2008," RIVISTA DI ECONOMIA E STATISTICA DEL TERRITORIO, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2014(1), pages 60-77.
    4. Schwarz, Peter, 2011. "Money launderers and tax havens: Two sides of the same coin?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 37-47, March.
    5. Laszlo Goerke, 2007. "Corporate and personal income tax declarations," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 14(3), pages 281-292, June.
    6. Michael Keen & Jenny Ligthart, 2006. "Information Sharing and International Taxation: A Primer," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 13(1), pages 81-110, January.
    7. Pierre Kopp, 2006. "La lutte contre le blanchiment," Post-Print halshs-00263618, HAL.
    8. Donato Masciandaro, 2005. "False and Reluctant Friends? National Money Laundering Regulation, International Compliance and Non-Cooperative Countries," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 17-30, July.
    9. Donato Masciandaro, 2008. "Offshore financial centres: the political economy of regulation," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 307-340, December.
    10. Ratbek Dzhumashev & Emin Gahramanov, 2010. "A Growth Model with Income Tax Evasion: Some Implications for Australia," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 86(275), pages 620-636, December.

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