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Political economy of prudent budgetary policy

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  • Frederick Ploeg, 2010. "Political economy of prudent budgetary policy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 17(3), pages 295-314, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:17:y:2010:i:3:p:295-314
    DOI: 10.1007/s10797-009-9117-0
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    1. Mark Hallerberg & Jürgen von Hagen, 1999. "Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 209-232, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Aiyagari, S. Rao & McGrattan, Ellen R., 1998. "The optimum quantity of debt," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 447-469, October.
    3. Stephen P. Zeldes, 1989. "Optimal Consumption with Stochastic Income: Deviations from Certainty Equivalence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(2), pages 275-298.
    4. Antoine Bommier, 2006. "Uncertain Lifetime And Intertemporal Choice: Risk Aversion As A Rationale For Time Discounting," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1223-1246, November.
    5. Kimball, Miles S, 1990. "Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(1), pages 53-73, January.
    6. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 21-36, March.
    7. Chari, V V & Christiano, Lawrence J & Kehoe, Patrick J, 1994. "Optimal Fiscal Policy in a Business Cycle Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 617-652, August.
    8. Barro, Robert J, 1979. "On the Determination of the Public Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 940-971, October.
    9. Louis Eeckhoudt & Christian Gollier, 2005. "The impact of prudence on optimal prevention," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(4), pages 989-994, November.
    10. William D. Nordhaus, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(2), pages 169-190.
    11. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 1990. "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(3), pages 403-414.
    12. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    13. von Hagen, Jurgen & Harden, Ian J., 1995. "Budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 771-779, April.
    14. Aiyagari, S Rao, 1995. "Optimal Capital Income Taxation with Incomplete Markets, Borrowing Constraints, and Constant Discounting," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1158-1175, December.
    15. Sibley, David S., 1975. "Permanent and transitory income effects in a model of optimal consumption with wage income uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 68-82, August.
    16. S. Rao Aiyagari & Albert Marcet & Thomas J. Sargent & Juha Seppala, 2002. "Optimal Taxation without State-Contingent Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(6), pages 1220-1254, December.
    17. Antoine Bommier & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2006. "Risk Aversion and Planning Horizons," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(4), pages 708-734, June.
    18. Swank, Otto H, 2002. "Budgetary Devices for Curbing Spending Prone Ministers and Bureaucrats," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 111(3-4), pages 237-257, June.
    19. Velasco, Andres, 2000. "Debts and deficits with fragmented fiscal policymaking," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 105-125, April.
    20. Hallerberg, Mark & von Hagen, Jürgen, 1997. "Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits within the European Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 1555, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chatagny, Florian, 2015. "Incentive effects of fiscal rules on the finance minister's behavior: Evidence from revenue projections in Swiss Cantons," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 184-200.
    2. Marc-Daniel Moessinger, 2014. "Do the personal characteristics of finance ministers affect changes in public debt?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(1), pages 183-207, October.
    3. Florian Chatagny & Nils Soguel, 2012. "The effect of tax revenue budgeting errors on fiscal balance: evidence from the Swiss cantons," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(3), pages 319-337, June.
    4. Simon Luechinger & Christoph Schaltegger, 2013. "Fiscal rules, budget deficits and budget projections," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(5), pages 785-807, October.
    5. Kollias, Christos & Papadamou, Stephanos & Psarianos, Iacovos, 2014. "Fiscal imbalances and asymmetric adjustment under Labour and Conservative governments in the UK," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 208-213.
    6. Paolo Vitale, 2017. "Pessimistic Optimal Choice for Risk-Averse Agents: The Continuous-Time Limit," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 49(1), pages 17-65, January.
    7. Zhiyong An & Yilin Hou, 2020. "Debt authority and intentional overstatement of budgetary deficit: evidence from Chinese Provinces," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(2), pages 461-477, April.
    8. van der Ploeg, Frederick, 2010. "Aggressive oil extraction and precautionary saving: Coping with volatility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(5-6), pages 421-433, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Precautionary taxation and saving; Common pool; Electoral budget cycles; H21; H60;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General

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