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Bounding preference parameters under different assumptions about beliefs: a partial identification approach

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  • Charles Bellemare
  • Luc Bissonnette
  • Sabine Kröger

Abstract

We show how bounds around preferences parameters can be estimated under various levels of assumptions concerning the beliefs of senders in the investment game. We contrast these bounds with point estimates of the preference parameters obtained using non-incentivized subjective belief data. Our point estimates suggest that expected responses and social preferences both play a significant role in determining investment in the game. Moreover, these point estimates fall within our most reasonable bounds. This suggests that credible inferences can be obtained using non-incentivized beliefs.
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  • Charles Bellemare & Luc Bissonnette & Sabine Kröger, 2010. "Bounding preference parameters under different assumptions about beliefs: a partial identification approach," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 13(3), pages 334-345, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:13:y:2010:i:3:p:334-345
    DOI: 10.1007/s10683-010-9244-6
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Eric Schniter & Roman M. Sheremeta & Timothy W. Shields, 2013. "Limitations to Signaling Trust with All or Nothing Investments," Working Papers 13-24, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    2. Paul Ruud & Daniel Schunk & Joachim Winter, 2014. "Uncertainty causes rounding: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(3), pages 391-413, September.
    3. Bellemare, Charles & Sebald, Alexander, 2011. "Learning about a Class of Belief-Dependent Preferences without Information on Beliefs," IZA Discussion Papers 5957, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Schniter, Eric & Sheremeta, Roman & Shields, Timothy, 2015. "The Problem with All-or-nothing Trust Games: What Others Choose Not to Do Matters In Trust-based Exchange," MPRA Paper 68561, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Leif Brandes & Donja Darai, 2014. "The value of top-down communication for organizational performance," ECON - Working Papers 157, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    6. Brandes, Leif & Darai, Donja, 2017. "The value and motivating mechanism of transparency in organizations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 189-198.
    7. Charles Bellemare & Alexander Sebald, 2019. "Measuring Belief-Dependent Preferences without Information about Beliefs," CESifo Working Paper Series 7505, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Partial identification; Preferences; Beliefs; Decision making under uncertainty; Investment game; C81;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C81 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data; Data Access

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