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Intergroup cooperation in the lab: asymmetric power relations and redistributive policies

Author

Listed:
  • Kerstin Mitterbacher

    (University of Graz)

  • Stefan Palan

    (University of Graz)

  • Jürgen Fleiß

    (University of Graz)

Abstract

We study intra- and intergroup cooperation in the production and distribution of a jointly created good. Over several periods, members of one group can choose whether or not to contribute to the good’s production. Members of the other group vote to implement a fair or a discriminatory sharing policy for the good’s proceeds. More cooperative behavior by members of an outgroup renders ingroup members more willing to cooperate in turn. Our experiment documents reciprocity in intergroup cooperation settings. This reciprocity at times leads to mutually beneficial cooperation but when one group defects, it may also lead to cooperation breaking down. Understanding how one group’s cooperation influences another group’s decisions can improve resource allocation as well as influence policy-makers’ decisions towards fairer distribution strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Kerstin Mitterbacher & Stefan Palan & Jürgen Fleiß, 2024. "Intergroup cooperation in the lab: asymmetric power relations and redistributive policies," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 51(4), pages 877-912, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:empiri:v:51:y:2024:i:4:d:10.1007_s10663-024-09623-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s10663-024-09623-1
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymmetric power relations; Intergroup game; Jointly created goods; Laboratory experiment; Redistributive policies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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