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Club governments versus representative governments

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  • Charles Blankart

Abstract

The paper compares the legal rules for private clubs with the constitutions of representative governments. Though both institutions are designed to provide public goods for their members they are organized quite differently. In clubs the power to grant power must not be delegated to the agents, while in representative governments it usually is. The design of representative governments is shown to be inconsistent with a contractarian view of the constitution. A nearly perfect laboratory case for a club government can be found in the example of Switzerland. In this country citizens are absolute sovereigns over their constitution. The Swiss do not have a constitutional court, but have developed instead a system of popular voting rights serving as a substitute for a judicial review by a constitutional court. Though this system does not work perfectly, it has relative advantages compared to a constitutional court which often tends to become a political decisionmaker. Copyright George Mason University 1994

Suggested Citation

  • Charles Blankart, 1994. "Club governments versus representative governments," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 273-285, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:5:y:1994:i:3:p:273-285
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02393261
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kirchgassner, Gebhard & Pommerehne, Werner W, 1993. "Low-Cost Decisions as a Challenge to Public Choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(1), pages 107-115, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Brandi, Clara & Wohlgemuth, Michael, 2006. "Strategies of Flexible Integration and Enlargement of the European Union: a Club-theoretical and Constitutional Economics Perspective," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 06/7, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    2. Gilroy, Bernard Michael, 1998. "International Competitiveness, Multinational Enterprise Technology Clubs and the Government Interface," MPRA Paper 17983, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Eusepi, Giuseppe, 2006. "Public finance and welfare: From the ignorance of the veil to the veil of ignorance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(4), pages 460-477, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    H10;

    JEL classification:

    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General

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