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Redistribution and constitutional political economy

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  • E. Pasour

Abstract

Economists since Pareto have sought to demonstrate that governmental redistribution to assist the poor increases overall welfare in society. This paper addresses the general issue of redistribution but focuses on two recent efforts to justify redistribution in the context of constitutional political economy. It is argued below that income insurance and other proposed rationale for redistribution overlook or minimize information and incentive problems endemic in all governmental programs to assist the poor. Two reasons for opposing legislated redistribution are discussed—the first rooted in pragmatic considerations, the other based on principle. The conclusions are twofold: (1) purported justifications for redistributive policies are inconsistent with methodological individualism, and (2) it is problematic as to whether imposing such an obligation on the public-at-large even at the constitutional level will improve the welfare of the poor and the non-poor. Copyright George Mason University 1994

Suggested Citation

  • E. Pasour, 1994. "Redistribution and constitutional political economy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 81-98, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:5:y:1994:i:1:p:81-98
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02393257
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. E. Pasour, 1981. "Pareto optimality as a guide to income redistribution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 75-87, January.
    2. Doti, James & Lee, Dwight, 1991. "The Market Economy: A Reader," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195332582.
    3. Richard E. Wagner, . "Parchment, Guns And Constitutional Order," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 384.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dailami, Monsoor, 2000. "Financial openness, democracy, and redistributive policy," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2372, The World Bank.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    H30;

    JEL classification:

    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General

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