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The demise of the Roman Republic: a faulty constitution?

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  • Richard Jankowski

    (SUNY at Fredonia)

Abstract

The Roman Republic was one of the earliest and long-lasting democracies (510-27 BCE). To prevent the creation of dictatorship, it had a system of separation of powers but it failed to protect the Roman Republic. The ultimate cause of the fall of the Roman Republic was due to the immense wealth that Rome accumulated from its empire and the impact this wealth had on Rome’s institutions, especially its generals. Cicero proposed constitutional reforms to prevent its demise. His reforms were unnecessary because the Roman Senate already had the constitutional authority to prevent its demise. The problem was that Senators lacked an incentive to use their constitutional authority to save Rome’s democracy.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Jankowski, 2021. "The demise of the Roman Republic: a faulty constitution?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 218-232, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:32:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s10602-021-09330-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-021-09330-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Óscar Gutiérrez & Marco Martínez-Esteller, 2022. "Tax collection in the Roman Empire: a new institutional economics approach," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 378-401, September.

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