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Using tax dollars for re-election: the impact of pork-barrel spending on electoral success

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  • J. Zachary Klingensmith

    (Penn State Erie, The Behrend College, Black School of Business)

Abstract

Pork-barrel spending is the appropriation of federal money for use in projects that only benefit narrowly defined groups. In the past, researchers have attempted to show that pork-barrel spending increases the likelihood of an incumbent being reelected but empirical evidence has been hard to find. I hypothesize that pork-barrel spending does not directly increase the likelihood of reelection; instead, pork-barrel spending can be used to increase fundraising and the additional campaign funds are then used to increase the likelihood of being reelected. I find that a $10 million increase in pork-barrel spending will lead to a 0.10% increase in the share of the vote in an election. While this may not seem like a major advantage to some, several elections over the past few years have been decided by

Suggested Citation

  • J. Zachary Klingensmith, 2019. "Using tax dollars for re-election: the impact of pork-barrel spending on electoral success," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 31-49, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:30:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s10602-018-9269-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-018-9269-y
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    Cited by:

    1. Peter Spáč, 2021. "Pork barrel politics and electoral returns at the local level," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 188(3), pages 479-501, September.
    2. Savu, A., 2021. "Reverse Political Coattails under a Technocratic Government: New Evidence on the National Electoral Benefits of Local Party Incumbency," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2121, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    3. Akihiko Kawaura & Yasutomo Kimura & Yuzu Uchida, 2024. "Deeds, not words? Speech and re-election of Japan’s local legislators," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 123-140, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Pork-barrel spending; Incumbency advantage; Elections; Campaign fundraising;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H59 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Other

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