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On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections

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  • Ferejohn, John A.

Abstract

Several authors have observed a decline in the number of competitive congressional districts during the past two decades. Various explanations have been proposed for this change. Among these are theories attributing major causal significance to changing methods of drawing district boundaries, and increasing control of campaign resources by incumbents. These theories are examined critically and arguments are advanced for their rejection. The principal cause of the decline of competition for congressional seats appears to rest on a change in individual voting behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Ferejohn, John A., 1977. "On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(1), pages 166-176, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:71:y:1977:i:01:p:166-176_25
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    Cited by:

    1. Matthew P. Dube & Jesse T. Clark & Richard J. Powell, 2022. "Graphical metrics for analyzing district maps," Journal of Computational Social Science, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 449-475, May.
    2. Douglas Hart & Michael Munger, 1989. "Declining electoral competitiveness in the House of Representatives: The differential impact of improved transportation technology," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 217-228, June.
    3. Bennett, Daniel L. & Long, Jason T., 2019. "Is it the economic policy, stupid? Economic policy, political parties & the gubernatorial incumbent advantage," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 118-137.
    4. Thomas Braendle & Alois Stutzer, 2010. "Public servants in parliament: theory and evidence on its determinants in Germany," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(1), pages 223-252, October.
    5. Larry Samuelson, 1984. "Electoral equilibria with restricted strategies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 307-327, January.
    6. Thomas Braendle & Alois Stutzer, 2008. "Bureaucrats in Parliament: Theory and Evidence on Its Determinants in Germany," CREMA Working Paper Series 2008-23, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    7. Timothy Besley & Ian Preston, 2007. "Electoral Bias and Policy Choice: Theory and Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(4), pages 1473-1510.
    8. Camilo Campos-Valdés & Eduardo Álvarez-Miranda & Mauricio Morales Quiroga & Jordi Pereira & Félix Liberona Durán, 2021. "The Impact of Candidates’ Profile and Campaign Decisions in Electoral Results: A Data Analytics Approach," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(8), pages 1-17, April.
    9. Wyss, Simone, 2008. "Ist die relative Schlechterstellung niedrigqualifizierter Arbeitskräfte Mythos oder Realität? - Eine Analyse der Schweizer Disparität von Lohn- und Arbeitslosenquote nach Qualifikation," Working papers 2008/06, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    10. J. Zachary Klingensmith, 2019. "Using tax dollars for re-election: the impact of pork-barrel spending on electoral success," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 31-49, March.
    11. Larry Samuelson, 1987. "A test of the revealed-preference phenomenon in congressional elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 141-169, January.
    12. Hideo Konishi & Chen‐Yu Pan, 2020. "Partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1183-1212, September.
    13. Friedman, Daniel & Wittman, Donald, 1995. "Why voters vote for incumbents but against incumbency: A rational choice explanation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 67-83, May.
    14. Linda Fowler, 1979. "The electoral lottery: Decisions to run for Congress," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 399-418, September.
    15. Yogesh Uppal, 2009. "The disadvantaged incumbents: estimating incumbency effects in Indian state legislatures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 9-27, January.
    16. Leandro De Magalhães, 2012. "Incumbency Effects in Brazilian Mayoral Elections: A Regression Discontinuity Design," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 12/284, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
    17. Manav Raj, 2021. "A house divided: Legislative competition and young firm survival in the United States," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(13), pages 2389-2419, December.
    18. M. V. Hood & Seth C. McKee, 2010. "Stranger Danger: Redistricting, Incumbent Recognition, and Vote Choice," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 91(2), pages 344-358, June.
    19. Kaare Strom, 1989. "Inter-party Competition in Advanced Democracies," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 1(3), pages 277-300, July.
    20. Marko Klašnja, 2016. "Increasing rents and incumbency disadvantage," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 28(2), pages 225-265, April.

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