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Fairness and efficiency in US Revolutionary War takings and post-war debt redemption

Author

Listed:
  • Jonathan Stone

    (Rochester Institute of Technology)

  • Jeffrey Wagner

    (Rochester Institute of Technology)

Abstract

Many have noted the debate amongst Hamilton, Jefferson, and others on compensating original versus final US Revolutionary War debt holders upon federal assumption of state debts in 1790. However, to our knowledge the economics literature has not yet proposed a theoretical model of the argument. The purpose of this paper is to propose a simple household-level economic model to capture the most salient aspects of the debate, including the role of military impressment and the emergence of the Takings Clause of the US Constitution.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan Stone & Jeffrey Wagner, 2016. "Fairness and efficiency in US Revolutionary War takings and post-war debt redemption," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 399-417, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:27:y:2016:i:4:d:10.1007_s10602-016-9219-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-016-9219-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hall, George J. & Sargent, Thomas J., 2014. "Fiscal discriminations in three wars," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 148-166.
    2. Thomas J. Sargent, 2012. "Nobel Lecture: United States Then, Europe Now," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(1), pages 1-40.
    3. Yun-chien Chang, 2012. "Economic Value or Fair Market Value: What Form of Takings Compensation Is Efficient?," Supreme Court Economic Review, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(1), pages 35-88.
    4. Bruno Frey & Matthias Benz & Alois Stutzer, 2004. "Introducing Procedural Utility: Not Only What, but Also How Matters," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(3), pages 377-401, September.
    5. Lankford, R. Hamilton, 1988. "Measuring welfare changes in settings with imposed quantities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 45-63, March.
    6. Donald Boudreaux & Jody Lipford & Bruce Yandle, 1995. "Regulatory takings and constitutional repair the 1990s' property-rights rebellion," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 171-190, June.
    7. Ferguson, E. James, 1954. "Speculation in the Revolutionary Debt: The Ownership of Public Securities in Maryland,1790," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 35-45, January.
    8. J. Michael Harrison & David M. Kreps, 1978. "Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock Market with Heterogeneous Expectations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 92(2), pages 323-336.
    9. Swanson, Donald F. & Trout, Andrew P., 1992. "Alexander Hamilton, conversion, and debt reduction," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 417-429, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Debt redemption; Takings Clause; US Revolutionary War debt;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H13 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Economics of Eminent Domain; Expropriation; Nationalization
    • N41 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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