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A note on the effect of elections subject to judicial review

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  • J. Arias

Abstract

The most recent U.S. presidential election raised the questions of whether or not agents who believe that losing candidates will contest the results of close elections perceive their vote as more important and whether or not they will be more or less likely to vote. The analysis involves a two-player voting game with one of the players initially in a weaker position because he loses all ties. The key variable is the probability of the weaker player winning the post-election judicial review process. The relationship between this probability and the level of voting for the weaker player is non-monotonic. Also, if this probability is sufficiently close to one-half, contesting close elections leads to increased voting, lowering social welfare. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2003

Suggested Citation

  • J. Arias, 2003. "A note on the effect of elections subject to judicial review," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 31(4), pages 376-383, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:31:y:2003:i:4:p:376-383
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02298495
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Guillermo Owen & Bernard Grofman, 1984. "To vote or not to vote: The paradox of nonvoting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 311-325, January.
    2. Gordon Tullock, 2000. "Some Further Thoughts on Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1), pages 181-182, July.
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