A Continuous-Time Optimal Insurance Design with Costly Monitoring
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DOI: 10.1007/s10690-014-9184-9
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More about this item
Keywords
Insurance; Costly monitoring; Moral hazard; Fraudulent claims; D82; D86; G22; G32;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
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