A Continuous-Time Optimal Insurance Design with Costly Monitoring
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1007/s10690-014-9184-9
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Rogerson, William P, 1985. "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1357-1367, November.
- Goldstein, Robert & Ju, Nengjiu & Leland, Hayne, 2001. "An EBIT-Based Model of Dynamic Capital Structure," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 74(4), pages 483-512, October.
- Martin F. Hellwig, 2000.
"Financial Intermediation with Risk Aversion,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(4), pages 719-742.
- Hellwig, Martin, 1998. "Financial intermediation with risk aversion," Papers 98-39, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
- Hellwig, Martin, 1998. "Financial Intermediation with Risk Aversion," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 98-39, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Jaap H. Abbring & Pierre-André Chiappori & Jean Pinquet, 2003.
"Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 767-820, June.
- Jean Pinquet & Jaap Abbring & Pierre-André Chiappori, 2003. "Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data," Post-Print hal-00397121, HAL.
- Jaap H. Abbring & Pierre-Andre Chiappori, 2004. "Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data," 2004 Meeting Papers 316, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Stephen D. Williamson, 1987.
"Costly Monitoring, Loan Contracts, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(1), pages 135-145.
- Stephen D. Williamson, 1984. "Costly Monitoring, Loan Contracts and Equilibrium Credit Rationing," Working Paper 572, Economics Department, Queen's University.
- Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987.
"Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-328, March.
- Bengt Holmstrom & Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 742, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Jaap H. Abbring & James J. Heckman & Pierre-André Chiappori & Jean Pinquet, 2003.
"Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard In Insurance: Can Dynamic Data Help to Distinguish?,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(2-3), pages 512-521, 04/05.
- Jean Pinquet & Pierre-André Chiappori & Jaap Abbring & James J Heckman, 2003. "Adverse selection and moral hazard in insurance: can dynamic data help to distinguish?," Post-Print hal-00397115, HAL.
- Georges Dionne & Florence Giuliano & Pierre Picard, 2009.
"Optimal Auditing with Scoring: Theory and Application to Insurance Fraud,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(1), pages 58-70, January.
- Georges Dionne & Florence Giuliano & Pierre Picard, 2005. "Optimal Auditing with Scoring Theory and Application to Insurance Fraud," Working Papers hal-00243026, HAL.
- Dionne, Georges & Giuliano, Florence & Picard, Pierre, 2008. "Optimal auditing with ccoring: Theory and application to insurance fraud," Working Papers 02-5, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
- Dionne, Georges & Giuliano, Florence & Picard, Pierre, 2009. "Optimal auditing with scoring: theory and application to insurance fraud," MPRA Paper 18374, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Misumi, Takashi & 三隅, 隆司 & Nakamura, Hisashi & 中村, 恒 & Takaoka, Koichiro & 髙岡, 浩一郎, 2013. "Optimal Risk Sharing in the Presence of Moral Hazard under Market Risk and Jump Risk," Working Paper Series G-1-4, Hitotsubashi University Center for Financial Research.
- Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Goergen, Marc & Manjon, Miguel C. & Renneboog, Luc, 2008.
"Recent developments in German corporate governance,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 175-193, September.
- Goergen, M. & Manjon, M.C. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2004. "Recent Developments in German Corporate Governance," Discussion Paper 2004-123, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Goergen, M. & Manjon, M.C. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2004. "Recent Developments in German Corporate Governance," Discussion Paper 2004-014, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Goergen, M. & Manjon, M.C. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2004. "Recent Developments in German Corporate Governance," Other publications TiSEM db2cef31-d47e-445d-ba35-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Goergen, M. & Manjon, M.C. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2004. "Recent Developments in German Corporate Governance," Other publications TiSEM f1cb70de-0638-4cfc-baf6-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Karel Janda, 2006. "Agency Theory Approach to the Contracting between Lender and Borrower [Smluvní vztah mezi věřitelem a dlužníkem z hlediska přístupu teorie zastoupení]," Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2006(3), pages 34-47.
- Karel Janda, 2006. "Lender and Borrower as Principal and Agent," Working Papers IES 2006/24, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2006.
- Dionne, Georges & Harrington, Scott, 2017. "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers 17-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
- Li, Yuanyuan & Wigniolle, Bertrand, 2017.
"Endogenous information revelation in a competitive credit market and credit crunch,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 127-141.
- Yuanyuan Li & Bertrand Wigniolle, 2016. "Endogenous information revelation in a competitive credit market and credit crunch," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01277539, HAL.
- Yuanyuan Li & Bertrand Wigniolle, 2017. "Endogenous information revelation in a competitive credit market and credit crunch," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01509773, HAL.
- Yuanyuan Li & Bertrand Wigniolle, 2016. "Endogenous information revelation in a competitive credit market and credit crunch," Post-Print halshs-01277539, HAL.
- Yuanyuan Li & Bertrand Wigniolle, 2017. "Endogenous information revelation in a competitive credit market and credit crunch," Post-Print halshs-01509773, HAL.
- Yuanyuan Li & Bertrand Wigniolle, 2016. "Endogenous information revelation in a competitive credit market and credit crunch," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 16001, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Yuanyuan Li & Bertrand Wigniolle, 2017. "Endogenous information revelation in a competitive credit market and credit crunch," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01509773, HAL.
- William Gornall & Ilya A. Strebulaev, 2013. "Financing as a Supply Chain: The Capital Structure of Banks and Borrowers," NBER Working Papers 19633, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Juha-Pekka Niinimäki & Tuomas Takalo, 2007. "Benchmarking and Comparing Entrepreneurs with Incomplete Information," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 20(2), pages 91-107, Autumn.
- Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2018.
"Moral hazard: Base models and two extensions,"
Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I, chapter 16, pages 453-485,
Edward Elgar Publishing.
- David Pérez-Castrillo & Inés Macho-Stadler, 2016. "Moral Hazard: Base Models and Two Extensions," Working Papers 883, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Ines Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2016. "Moral Hazard: Base Models and Two Extensions," CESifo Working Paper Series 5851, CESifo.
- Santos, Joao C., 1997.
"Debt and equity as optimal contracts,"
Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 355-366, December.
- João A. C. Santos, 1995. "Debt and equity as optimal contracts," Working Papers (Old Series) 9505, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
- Robin Boadway & Motohiro Sato & Jean-Francois Tremblay, 2015.
"Cash-flow business taxation revisited: bankruptcy, risk aversion and asymmetric information,"
Working Papers
1531, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
- Robin Boadway & Motohiro Sato & Jean-François Tremblay, 2017. "Cash-Flow Business Taxation Revisited: Bankruptcy, Risk Aversion and Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 1713E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
- Robin Boadway & Jean-Francois Tremblay & Motohiro Sato, 2016. "Cash-flow Business Taxation Revisited: Bankruptcy, Risk Aversion And Asymmetric Information," Working Paper 1372, Economics Department, Queen's University.
- Demougin, Dominique M. & Fabel, Oliver, 2006. "The division of ownership in new ventures," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2006-047, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
- Berger, Allen N. & Espinosa-Vega, Marco A. & Frame, W. Scott & Miller, Nathan H., 2011.
"Why do borrowers pledge collateral? New empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information,"
Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 55-70, January.
- Allen N. Berger & Marco A. Espinosa-Vega & W. Scott Frame & Nathan H. Miller, 2007. "Why do borrowers pledge collateral? new empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2006-29, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Michael Brei & Carlos Winograd, 2018.
"Credit risk of foreign bank branches and subsidiaries in Argentina and Uruguay,"
EconomiX Working Papers
2018-12, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
- Michael Brei & Carlos Winograd, 2018. "Credit risk of foreign bank branches and subsidiaries in Argentina and Uruguay," Working Papers hal-04141776, HAL.
- Yongfu Huang, 2011.
"Private investment and financial development in a globalized world,"
Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 43-56, August.
- Yongfu Huang, 2006. "Private investment and financial development in a globalized world," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 06/589, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- Régis Breton, 2003.
"A Smoke Screen Theory of Financial Intermediation,"
Post-Print
halshs-00257188, HAL.
- Régis Breton, 2007. "A Smoke Screen Theory of Financial Intermediation," Post-Print halshs-00256837, HAL.
- Régis Breton, 2006. "A Smoke Screen Theory of Financial Intermediation," Post-Print halshs-00256839, HAL.
- Régis Breton, 2006. "A Smoke Screen Theory of Financial Intermediation," Post-Print halshs-00257192, HAL.
- Breton, R., 2011. "A smoke screen theory of financial intermediation," Working papers 356, Banque de France.
- Régis Breton, 2006. "A Smoke Screen Theory of Financial Intermediation," Working Papers halshs-00009595, HAL.
- Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, "undated".
"Remedies for Sick Insurance,"
Working Papers
620, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, 2013. "Remedies for Sick Insurance," Documentos de Trabajo 302, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Daniel L. McFadden & Carlos E. Noton & Pau Olivella, 2012. "Remedies for Sick Insurance," NBER Working Papers 17938, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sjur Didrik Flåm & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2015. "Liability Insurance and Choice of Cars: A Large Game Approach," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(6), pages 943-963, December.
- Sigurd Galaasen & Rustam Jamilov & Hélène Rey & Ragnar Juelsrud, 2020.
"Granular credit risk,"
Working Paper
2020/15, Norges Bank.
- Rey, Hélène & Galaasen, Sigurd & Jamilov, Rustam & Juelsrud, Ragnar, 2020. "Granular Credit Risk," CEPR Discussion Papers 15385, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Sigurd Galaasen & Rustam Jamilov & Ragnar Juelsrud & Hélène Rey, 2020. "Granular Credit Risk," NBER Working Papers 27994, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Zhixiong Zeng, 2013.
"A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(2), pages 729-754, March.
- Zeng, Zhixiong, 2010. "A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization," MPRA Paper 24752, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Zeng, Zhixiong, 2011. "A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization," MPRA Paper 33471, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- John H. Boyd & Pedro Gomis-Porqueras & Sungkyu Kwak & Bruce David Smith, 2014.
"A User's Guide to Banking Crises,"
Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 15(2), pages 800-892, November.
- John H. Boyd & Pedro Gomis & Sungkyu Kwak & Bruce D. Smith, 2000. "A User's Guide to Banking Crises," Monash Economics Working Papers archive-36, Monash University, Department of Economics.
More about this item
Keywords
Insurance; Costly monitoring; Moral hazard; Fraudulent claims; D82; D86; G22; G32;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:apfinm:v:21:y:2014:i:3:p:237-261. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.