IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/apfinm/v19y2012i4p353-370.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Performance Regularity: A New Class of Executive Compensation Packages

Author

Listed:
  • Carole Bernard
  • Olivier Le Courtois

Abstract

The ability of standard executive stock options to incite managers to adequately select the assets of their firm has been extensively questioned by academics and practitioners. However, very few alternatives exist or have been proposed to better control the investment strategies of top managers. The present article studies the evaluation and sensitivity of a new class of executive stock options well designed for the control of managers. Such packages are aimed at giving incentives to CEOs to maintain a regular performance over time and a stable volatility level. The importance and implications of the choice of the different parameters as well as their robustness with respect to standard financial criteria are examined. In brief, this article studies in a utility-based framework a new type of executive stock options that can be useful to protect and enhance the economic performance of corporations. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2012

Suggested Citation

  • Carole Bernard & Olivier Le Courtois, 2012. "Performance Regularity: A New Class of Executive Compensation Packages," Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Springer;Japanese Association of Financial Economics and Engineering, vol. 19(4), pages 353-370, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:apfinm:v:19:y:2012:i:4:p:353-370
    DOI: 10.1007/s10690-012-9153-0
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10690-012-9153-0
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10690-012-9153-0?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hall, Brian J. & Murphy, Kevin J., 2002. "Stock options for undiversified executives," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 3-42, February.
    2. Carole Bernard & Phelim Boyle, 2011. "Monte Carlo methods for pricing discrete Parisian options," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(3), pages 169-196.
    3. Robert C. Merton, 2005. "Theory of rational option pricing," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Sudipto Bhattacharya & George M Constantinides (ed.), Theory Of Valuation, chapter 8, pages 229-288, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Kevin J. Murphy & Brian J. Hall, 2000. "Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 209-214, May.
    5. Johnson, Shane A. & Tian, Yisong S., 2000. "The value and incentive effects of nontraditional executive stock option plans," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 3-34, July.
    6. Lambert, Ra & Larcker, Df & Verrecchia, Re, 1991. "Portfolio Considerations In Valuing Executive-Compensation," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 129-149.
    7. Robert B. Barsky & F. Thomas Juster & Miles S. Kimball & Matthew D. Shapiro, 1997. "Preference Parameters and Behavioral Heterogeneity: An Experimental Approach in the Health and Retirement Study," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(2), pages 537-579.
    8. Black, Fischer & Scholes, Myron S, 1973. "The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 637-654, May-June.
    9. Chance, Don M., 2009. "Liquidity and employee options: An empirical examination of the Microsoft experience," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 469-487, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hyungshin Park & Dimitris Vrettos, 2015. "The Moderating Effect of Relative Performance Evaluation on the Risk Incentive Properties of Executives’ Equity Portfolios," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(5), pages 1055-1108, December.
    2. Kwangil Bae & Jangkoo Kang & Hwa‐Sung Kim, 2018. "Call options with concave payoffs: An application to executive stock options," Journal of Futures Markets, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 38(8), pages 943-957, August.
    3. Tang, Chun-Hua, 2012. "Revisiting the incentive effects of executive stock options," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 564-574.
    4. Brian J. Hall & Thomas A. Knox, 2002. "Managing Option Fragility," NBER Working Papers 9059, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Hamza Bahaji, 2009. "Contribution à l'analyse des déterminants du comportement d'exercice des porteurs de stock options : une étude empirique sur le marché Américain," Working Papers halshs-00512840, HAL.
    6. Kevin F. Hallock & Craig Olson, 2006. "The Value of Stock Options to Non-Executive Employees," NBER Working Papers 11950, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Liljeblom, Eva & Pasternack, Daniel & Rosenberg, Matts, 2011. "What determines stock option contract design?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 293-316.
    8. Brian J. Hall & Thomas A. Knox, 2004. "Underwater Options and the Dynamics of Executive Pay‐to‐Performance Sensitivities," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 365-412, May.
    9. Kuang, Yu Flora & Qin, Bo, 2009. "Performance-vested stock options and interest alignment," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 46-61.
    10. Muurling, Rutger & Lehnert, Thorsten, 2004. "Option-based compensation: a survey," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 365-401.
    11. Jenter, Dirk, 2004. "Executive Compensation, Incentives, and Risk," Working papers 4466-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    12. Abdelaziz Elmarzougui, 2006. "Evolution et sensibilité des stock-options : cas du marché français," Working Papers hal-04138526, HAL.
    13. Chaigneau, Pierre, 2013. "Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 4-23.
    14. Wu, Yan Wendy, 2011. "Optimal executive compensation: Stock options or restricted stocks," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 633-644, October.
    15. Konstandatos, Otto, 2020. "Fair-value analytical valuation of reset executive stock options consistent with IFRS9 requirements," Annals of Actuarial Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 188-218, March.
    16. Kevin J. Murphy & Brian J. Hall, 2000. "Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 209-214, May.
    17. Sautner, Zacharias & Weber, Martin, 2005. "Stock options and employee behavior," Papers 05-26, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    18. George P. Baker & Brian J. Hall, 2004. "CEO Incentives and Firm Size," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(4), pages 767-798, October.
    19. Kuang, Y. & Qin, B., 2006. "Performance-vested Stock Options and Pay-Performance Sensitivity," Discussion Paper 2006-123, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    20. Tian, Yisong S., 2004. "Too much of a good incentive? The case of executive stock options," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 1225-1245, June.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:apfinm:v:19:y:2012:i:4:p:353-370. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.