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Private payment systems, collateral, and interest rates

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  • Charles Kahn

Abstract

Recent developments in private payments arrangements, particularly at the wholesale level, (including recent innovations in China) challenge central banks’ longstanding monopoly on the provision of the ultimate means of settlement for financial transactions. This paper examines competition between public payments arrangements and private intermediaries, and the effect on central banks’ role in monetary policy. Central to the issue is the role of collateral both as a requirement for participation in central bank sponsored payments arrangements and as the backing for private intermediary arrangements. The presence of private systems serves as a check on the ability of a monetary authority to tighten monetary policy. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Charles Kahn, 2013. "Private payment systems, collateral, and interest rates," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 83-114, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:annfin:v:9:y:2013:i:1:p:83-114
    DOI: 10.1007/s10436-011-0186-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. M. Peiris & Alexandros Vardoulakis, 2015. "Collateral and the efficiency of monetary policy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(3), pages 579-603, August.
    2. Tomura, Hajime, 2018. "Payment instruments and collateral in the interbank payment system," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 82-104.
    3. Choi, Hyung Sun, 2023. "Money, payments systems, limited participation, and central banking," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    4. Park, Jaevin & Kwon, Ohik, 2023. "Stablecoins: Legal restrictions theory and monetary policy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
    5. Choi, Hyung Sun, 2019. "Money, debit card, gross-settlement risk, and central banking," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Payment systems; Collateral; Monetary policy; Inside money; E52; E58; G21; G28;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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