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Unternehmensleitung und Innovationserfolg / Corporate Management and Innovation

Author

Listed:
  • Czarnitzki Dirk

    (Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Postfach 10 3443, D-68034 Mannheim)

  • Kraft Kornelius

    (Universität Dortmund, D-44221 Dortmund)

Abstract

This article compares the innovative activity of managerial and owner-led firms. The incentives to innovate for managers depend on a trade-off: While the risk associated with innovative activities is a negative stimulus, the possible sales growth in case of success is a positive incentive. In light of this conflicting incentives, we investigate empirically whether firms led by owners or by managers are more innovative. By use of a sample of 2,018 observations at the firm level we show that owner-led firms achieve less sales with new products than others.

Suggested Citation

  • Czarnitzki Dirk & Kraft Kornelius, 2003. "Unternehmensleitung und Innovationserfolg / Corporate Management and Innovation," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 223(6), pages 641-658, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:223:y:2003:i:6:p:641-659
    DOI: 10.1515/jbnst-2003-0602
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    References listed on IDEAS

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