IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/jmi/articl/jmi-v9i1a4.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Existence of Equilibrium Flows

Author

Listed:
  • Alfred Galichon

    (New York University, USA and Sciences Po, France)

  • Larry Samuelson

    (Yale University, USA)

  • Lucas Vernet

    (Sciences Po and Banque de France, France)

Abstract

In this paper, we establish conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in the equilibrium flow problem studied by Galichon et al. (2024). The problem nests several classical economic models such as bipartite matching models, hedonic pricing models, shortest-path and minimum-cost flow problems, and time-dependent routing problems.

Suggested Citation

  • Alfred Galichon & Larry Samuelson & Lucas Vernet, 2024. "The Existence of Equilibrium Flows," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 9(1), pages 55-81, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v9i1a4
    DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2024.12.004
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.mechanism-design.org/arch/v009-1/p_04.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22574/jmid.2024.12.004?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alfred Galichon & Scott Duke Kominers & Simon Weber, 2019. "Costly Concessions: An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(6), pages 2875-2925.
    2. Ivar Ekeland & James J. Heckman & Lars Nesheim, 2004. "Identification and Estimation of Hedonic Models," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(S1), pages 60-109, February.
    3. Crawford, Vincent P & Knoer, Elsie Marie, 1981. "Job Matching with Heterogeneous Firms and Workers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(2), pages 437-450, March.
    4. Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David, 1985. "The Strategy Structure of Two-sided Matching Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 873-888, July.
    5. Federico Echenique & Sangmok Lee & Matthew Shum, 2011. "The Money Pump as a Measure of Revealed Preference Violations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(6), pages 1201-1223.
    6. Pierre-André Chiappori & Robert McCann & Lars Nesheim, 2010. "Hedonic price equilibria, stable matching, and optimal transport: equivalence, topology, and uniqueness," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 42(2), pages 317-354, February.
    7. Georg Nöldeke & Larry Samuelson, 2018. "The Implementation Duality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(4), pages 1283-1324, July.
    8. Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November.
    9. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6486 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1987. "A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasi-linear context," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 191-200, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Alfred Galichon & Simon Weber, 2024. "Matching under Imperfectly Transferable Utility," Papers 2403.05222, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
    2. Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2020. "Serial Vickrey Mechanism," ISER Discussion Paper 1095, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    3. Alfred Galichon & Larry Samuelson & Lucas Vernet, 2022. "Monotone Comparative Statics for Equilibrium Problems," Working Papers hal-03936102, HAL.
    4. Alfred Galichon & Larry Samuelson & Lucas Vernet, 2022. "Monotone Comparative Statics for Equilibrium Problems," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03936102, HAL.
    5. Alfred Galichon & Larry Samuelson & Lucas Vernet, 2022. "Monotone Comparative Statics for Equilibrium Problems," Papers 2207.06731, arXiv.org.
    6. Alfred Galichon & Scott Kominers & Simon Weber, 2014. "An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility," Working Papers hal-03460155, HAL.
    7. Alfred Galichon, 2021. "The unreasonable effectiveness of optimal transport in economics," Papers 2107.04700, arXiv.org.
    8. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5kmb4ke32h9ur9159sab6hvkck is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Galichon, Alfred & Samuelson, Larry & Vernet, Lucas, 0. "Unified gross substitutes and inverse isotonicity for equilibrium problems," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    10. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques, 2024. "Expectational equilibria in many-to-one matching models with contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
    11. Michael Greinecker & Christopher Kah, 2021. "Pairwise Stable Matching in Large Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(6), pages 2929-2974, November.
    12. Alfred Galichon, 2021. "The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Optimal Transport in Economics," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03936221, HAL.
    13. P. Jean‐Jacques Herings & Yu Zhou, 2022. "Competitive Equilibria In Matching Models With Financial Constraints," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(2), pages 777-802, May.
    14. Alfred Galichon & Scott Kominers & Simon Weber, 2014. "An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility," Working Papers hal-03460155, HAL.
    15. Alfred Galichon, 2021. "The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Optimal Transport in Economics," Working Papers hal-03936221, HAL.
    16. Marco LiCalzi, 2022. "Bipartite choices," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 45(2), pages 551-568, December.
    17. Han, Seungjin & Yamaguchi, Shintaro, 2015. "Compensating wage differentials in stable job matching equilibrium," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 36-45.
    18. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Ostroy, Joseph M., 2002. "The Package Assignment Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 377-406, December.
    19. Odran Bonnet & Alfred Galichon & Yu-Wei Hsieh & Keith O’Hara & Matt Shum, 2022. "Yogurts Choose Consumers? Estimation of Random-Utility Models via Two-Sided Matching," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(6), pages 3085-3114.
    20. Alvin Roth, 2008. "Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 537-569, March.
    21. Alfred Galichon & Bernard Salani'e, 2021. "Cupid's Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models," Papers 2106.02371, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Equilibrium flow; unified gross substitutes; matching.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v9i1a4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Paul Schweinzer (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deyoruk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.