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Bayesian Bullshit

Author

Listed:
  • Sajan Srivastava

    (University of Pennsylvania, USA)

  • Tymofiy Mylovanov

    (University of Pittsburgh, USA)

  • Rakesh Vohra

    (University of Pennsylvania, USA)

Abstract

A bullshitter neither knows nor cares about the truth, and therefore, it has been asserted, is more pernicious than a liar. We examine this assertion within the standard model of cheap talk communication where a bullshitter is modeled as an uninformed Sender. We show that in some circumstances, uncertainty about whether the Sender is informed or not can increase the welfare of the Receiver.

Suggested Citation

  • Sajan Srivastava & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Rakesh Vohra, 2024. "Bayesian Bullshit," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 9(1), pages 13-53, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v9i1a3
    DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2024.12.003
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Goltsman, Maria & Hörner, Johannes & Pavlov, Gregory & Squintani, Francesco, 2009. "Mediation, arbitration and negotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1397-1420, July.
    2. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bayesian persuasion; information design; cheap talk.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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