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Matching with compatibility constraints: The case of the Canadian medical residency match

Author

Listed:
  • Muhammad Maaz

    (Faculty of Health Sciences, McMaster University, Canada)

  • Anastasios Papanastasiou

    (Department of Economics, McMaster University, Canada)

Abstract

The Canadian medical residency match has received considerable attention in the medical community as several students go unmatched every year. Simultaneously, several residency positions go unfilled, largely in Quebec, the Francophone province of Canada. In Canada, positions are designated with a language restriction, a phenomenon that has not been described previously in the matching literature. We develop the model of matching with compatibility constraints, where, based on a dual-valued characteristic, a subset of students is incompatible with a subset of hospitals, and show how such constraints lead to inefficiency. We derive a lower bound for the number of Anglophone and Francophone residency positions such that every student is matched for all instances of (a form of) preferences. Our analysis suggests that to guarantee a stable match for every student, a number of positions at least equal to the population of bilingual students must be left unfilled.

Suggested Citation

  • Muhammad Maaz & Anastasios Papanastasiou, 2020. "Matching with compatibility constraints: The case of the Canadian medical residency match," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 5(1), pages 99-117, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v5i1a4
    DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2020.12.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Roth, Alvin E., 2003. "The origins, history, and design of the resident match," Scholarly Articles 35059715, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Two-sided matching; CaRMS; matching with constraints.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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